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Abstract 
In recent years, trust has emerged as a key concept in the understanding of cooperation 
between individuals and organizations.  It has been implicated as an important variable in 
topics ranging from individual decision-making in finance, to macroeconomic growth 
and stability in developing countries. This thesis employs an experimental design to 
investigate the impact of emotions on trust behavior. In the experiment, emotion was 
induced in participants who then played a basic trust game originally proposed by Berg, 
Dickhaut, & McCabe (1995). Results indicate that emotions do impact trust, with anger 
decreasing trust behavior. However, the data also reveal that individual propensity for 
risk as well as attachment to a community play a role in the effect of emotions on 
trust.  This finding contributes to the current literature in that it provides empirical 
evidence not only for the impact of emotions on trust but also for the relationship 
between emotions, risk, and trust behavior. The implications of these findings are 
discussed in light of recent literature in behavioral economics. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Why Behavioral Economics? 
 
A physicist, a chemist and an economist are stranded on an island with nothing to eat. A 
can of soup washes ashore. The physicist says, "Lets smash the can open with a rock." 
The chemist says, "Let’s build a fire and heat the can first." The economist says, "Lets 
assume that we have a can-opener..." 
 
Behavioral economics 
 
 Modern conceptions of behavioral economics first appeared during the mid 
1900’s with the development of cognitive and behavioral psychology.  According to 
Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004), “behavioral economics increases the 
explanatory power of economics by providing it with more realistic psychological 
foundations,” (p. 3).   
This movement towards psychological realism in economics reflected increasing 
discontent with neoclassical assumptions of rational choice, expected utility, and 
discounted utility models.  Essentially, the development of behavioral economics was 
facilitated by increasing dissatisfaction with economic models that assumed the existence 
of a ‘can opener,’ rational human behavior.  Concurrently, a shift in psychology resulted 
in a rise in research on behavior, decision-making, judgments, and information 
processing which allowed a framework against which to compare neoclassical 
assumptions regarding human behavior.  As a result, behavioral economics has emerged 
from the union of these simultaneous trends in psychology and economics.  
 Despite the relatively recent development of modern behavioral economics, the 
ideas expounded by behavioral economists date back to the founding of economics as a 
field of study.  For example, Adam Smith, often referred to as the founder of modern 
economics, wrote “we suffer more… when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than 
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we ever enjoy when we rise from a worse to a better,” (Smith, 1759, p. 311).  Smith 
effectively described loss aversion in an economic setting over 200 years before 
Kahneman and Tversky investigated the phenomenon for the first time using 
psychological experiments (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).   
Writers from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill and David Ricardo addressed this 
notion of the psychology of economics in one way or another.  The turn away from 
psychological underpinnings to economic theory came with the rise of neoclassical 
economics in the 1870’s.  As a result, behavioral economists have recently argued that 
modern behavioral economics represents a return to the basic ideas of classical 
economics, as opposed to the creation of a new field of study (Camerer, Loewenstein & 
Rabin, 2004).  I believe that this return to the roots of economics holds invaluable 
promise in terms improving current economic models and theory.   
Introduction 
 Drawing on theories and empirical evidence from economics and psychology, this 
senior thesis investigates the effect of emotions on trust decisions.  This area of study 
piqued my interest because, while largely overlooked in mainstream economics, emotions 
and trust decisions are key to an understanding of economic behavior.  The empirical 
component of this study is based on an experiment that looks at the relationship between 
these two variables at the microeconomic level.  Within my experimental design, trust 
behavior is measured within the framework of economic decision-making.  This is done 
using a modified version of a trust game originally proposed by Berg, Dickhaut, and 
McCabe (1995), which has become a staple of behavioral game theory.  In addition to 
measuring the effect of emotions on trust behavior, I utilize self-report measures to 
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include other variables, such as risk and empathy, in the analysis and to provide a unique 
perspective on micro-level trust behavior.   
The key research question that this study investigates is, to what extent do 
emotions, specifically incidental emotions, impact trust behavior?  In order to provide a 
basis for addressing this question, the next four chapters will review literature from both 
economics and social psychology.  Chapter two will review literature on trust in 
economics.  This chapter will compare neoclassical conceptions of trust to recent studies 
of trust in behavioral economics.  It will then demonstrate the importance of trust in 
economic interactions on both a micro and macroeconomic level.  Chapter three will 
review the relevant literature on emotions theory in order to develop a working definition 
for emotions in this study.  The chapter will analyze different theories on the structure 
and elicitation mechanisms of emotions as well as the relationship between emotions and 
observed behaviors.  
 The fourth chapter will cover emotions in judgment and decision-making.  It will 
begin by reviewing several emotion theories that apply to decision making in order to 
provide a theoretical framework for the current research.  Once this framework has been 
established, the chapter will investigate the role of emotions in economics and how 
emotions have been perceived within the framework of economic decision-making.  
Finally, chapter five will begin by reviewing the literature on emotions and trust and then 
introduce the experimental design, utilizing the theoretical framework in chapter four as a 
basis. 
 After this literature review, chapters six and seven will describe the methodology 
and report the results of the experiment.  Chapter eight will then discuss the findings and 
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 4	  
key implications of this study, evaluate how this study is contextualized in current 
literature, and offer suggestions for future research.   
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Chapter 2 
Trust in Economics 
“Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and 
cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of 
that community” (Fukuyama, 1995:26) 
 
What is trust and why is it important? 
 The idea of social capital was first formally introduced by Loury (1977) in an 
attempt to explain socioeconomic stratification among racial groups in the U.S 
(Akcomak, 2011).  This notion has subsequently come into widespread use in many of 
the social sciences since the 1990’s.  In the last two decades it has been instrumental in 
the analysis of economic development on both a macroeconomic and microeconomic 
level.   
 Social capital is defined as the information, trust, and norms of reciprocity 
inherent in a social network (Woolcock, 1998).  While both are viewed as important 
determinants of economic position, social capital differs from the traditional neoclassical 
concept of human capital.  At the basic level, human capital is evaluated according to 
individual differences in education and work experience (Hanushek, 2013; Becker, 
1975).  In contrast, social capital provides a broader explanation for differences in 
economic development by addressing societal mechanisms that impact growth.  Another 
way to think about it is that human capital might provide an individual-level explanation 
for economic mobility by evaluating personal differences in education and work 
experience (Loury, 1977). In contrast, the unit of analysis in research on social capital is 
not the individual but the interactions between individuals; social capital is the foundation 
for interactions and economic exchanges in the market (Woolcock, 1998). Whereas 
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 6	  
human capital refers to ability and the “quality” of individuals, social capital refers to 
opportunity and is a quality created between people (Burt 1997; Coleman 1994). 
Several important studies over the past two decades have indicated that social 
capital is critical to economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997, Putnam 1993; La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Salanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Golding & Katz, 1999).  If this is the case, 
we must ask ourselves, what are the components and preconditions of social capital 
formation?   
According to the definition of social capital given by Woolcock (1998), trust is 
one component of social capital. Several researchers have gone a step further and argued 
that trust is not only a component of social capital, but is also a necessary precondition of 
social capital formation in a society (Fukuyama, 1995; Coleman, 1988; Putnam 1993).  
Fukuyama states that social capital is in fact “a capability that arises from the prevalence 
of trust in a society or in certain parts of it” (Fukuyama, 1995; p. 26). 
 This observation has led scholars to conclude that trust plays an integral role in 
social capital formation and economic development because it fosters cooperation.  
Furthermore, they assert that the most effective organizations and economic ventures are 
those that are grounded in shared ethical values, which foster cooperation (Fukuyama, 
1995).  Thus, trust, in an economic context, is imperative to cooperation between 
individuals and organizations, which forms the basis of economic function.   
 To better explain the role of trust in economic behavior, the following sections 
will first provide an analysis of different viewpoints on trust within economics and then 
attempt to reach a conclusion in regard to what the role of trust is in economic 
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transactions and how this might influence macro-level economic growth and 
development. 
Trust in mainstream economics 
 Rational choice theory has long been foundational to conceptions of human 
behavior in neoclassical economics.  The most basic and critical assumption held by 
rational choice theory is that people aim to maximize their utility (Grafstein, 1995).  In 
other words, the theory predicts that the market will function with each individual acting 
in pure, unbridled, self-interest.  
 In economic terms, utility maximization means that an individual will take the 
course of action that will yield the highest possible expected monetary return.  If we 
accept that monetary reward is the defining measure of utility for an economic entity, this 
assumption of self-interest yields at least one interesting conclusion:  It excludes the 
possibility of behaviors such as altruism, reciprocity, fairness, and trust in an economic 
interaction. 
 This conclusion is best demonstrated with a simple example of a strategic 
interaction between two players.  Assuming that player 1 is a sophisticated player, and 
assumes player 2’s rationality, he will know that any monetary sum entrusted to player 2 
(for the purpose of investment or otherwise) will not be returned if player 2 is given an 
option of how much of a return to give.  In other words, player 2 will maximize his or her 
utility by not reciprocating and player 1 will be aware of this.  Thus, player 1 will not 
trust player 2 to give her/him any monetary gains because reciprocity and fairness do not 
exist in a model with perfectly rational players. If both players maximize their utility, and 
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each player knows that the other player is maximizing his/her utility, there can be no trust 
between players without exogenous assurances.   
 How then, does the neoclassical framework explain cooperation within economic 
exchanges?  One explanation is that self-interest will naturally cause people to cooperate.  
This applies to situations such as direct trades in which one party exchanges goods or 
services with another at a single point in time and both parties come off better due to 
comparative advantage.  However, situations such as labor agreements in which goods or 
services are provided for future payment (instead of payment at the time of the 
transaction) abound in the real world.  Rational choice theory would indicate that 
economic agents would fail to cooperate in any such situation.  For these situations, 
neoclassical economists have posited that exogenous assurances would provide 
incentives for cooperation.   
 Exogenous assurances encompass institutions such as legal contracts, government 
backed property rights, and contract enforcement.  Therefore, neoclassical economists 
argue that trust is not necessary for real-world interactions involving cooperation.  
Instead, economic agents, operating rationally on the principle of self-interest, will 
cooperate under the assurance of contracts, incentives, and legal mechanisms (Fukuyama, 
1995; Knack & Keefer, 1997).   
 This view of trust and cooperation is the prevalent view in mainstream 
economics.  However, we must ask, do real world data reflect this conception of the 
nonexistent and unnecessary nature of trust?  Does trust behavior actually exist in an 
economic sense or do individuals act in accordance with rational choice theory and rely 
purely on self-interest and exogenous assurances for cooperative behavior? 
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Conceptions of trust in behavioral economics 
 Several studies have investigated whether economic agents behave in a rational 
way when faced with decisions of trust.  For example, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 
(1995) proposed an experimental trust game based on strategic interaction.  In this game, 
an Investor is given and endowment X which they can choose to keep or invest.  If the 
Investor decides to invest X, he or she will earn a return of (1+r), with r being a constant.  
The total amount of money post-investment (1+r)T, with T being the portion of the 
endowment invested, is given to an anonymous Trustee who must decide how to allocate 
this new sum of money between themselves and the Investor.   
 According to rational choice theory, the Trustee would maximize his or her utility 
by keeping the entirety of this new sum and the Investor, knowing this, would not invest 
any money to begin with.  This study has been carried out numerous times and the results 
show that, among adult populations in industrialized countries, most Investors choose to 
invest a significant part of the endowment, indicating trusting in an anonymous player.  
In addition, due to principles of fairness and reciprocity1, the Trustee generally repays the 
Investor with a significant sum, with repayments averaging 110% of the original invested 
amount in many studies (Ortmann, Fitzgerald & Boeing, 2000).  Therefore, counter to 
rational choice theory, the Investors in this strategic interaction on average maximize 
their utility through trust behavior.  They rely on ‘honest and cooperative behavior, based 
on commonly shared norms’ to induce the other player to reciprocate their trust.   
 Another interesting study similarly investigated trust, but did so outside of the 
limited laboratory construct (Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson & Lockwood, 2006). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Fairness and reciprocity also contribute to the concept of social capital. They can be defined as social 
norms that induce people to reciprocate risky moves on the part of others despite a reduction in utility as a 
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Researchers conducted a field experiment in which they utilized an eBay auction with 
two vendors selling identical products at different times (Resnick et al., 2006).  One seller 
was established and had a good reputation whereas the other seller was new and had no 
buyer feedback and therefore no reputation2.  The researchers found that trust, generated 
from a strong reputation and positive buyer feedback, resulted in a price premium for the 
established seller (Resnick et al., 2006).   
 These results indicate that, in an environment with limited information on the 
seller such as Internet retail, the ability to trust a seller in their honesty and fulfillment of 
a purchase seems to be a factor for which buyers are willing to pay an additional cost.  
This behavior runs counter to normative predictions of rational choice theory.  In 
neoclassical models, markets are assumed to have no information asymmetries and 
rational actors are presumed to be able to analyze and incorporate all information into 
their decision-making.  Contrary to this assertion, buyers seem to rely almost solely on 
sale volume in determining how trustworthy a seller is (Resnick et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, instead of maximizing their utility by paying the lowest possible price and 
analyzing the greatest amount of data (product quality, geographic location, written 
comments, seller website quality), buyers seemed to be willing to pay a price premium to 
buy from a more trustworthy, established, seller.  This indicates that trust plays a role in 
real world sales interactions and is important enough to garner a price premium, 
especially in information-ambiguous situations. 
Trust has also been shown to play a key role in employer-employee relationships.  
The ‘paradox of organizational trust’ for example, relates to the debate over whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The researchers created the vendors’ merchant accounts and buyer accounts in order to supply feedback 
and ratings to the vendor account with the ‘good reputation.’	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incentive plans in the workplace improve employee performance (Rigdon, 2006).  
According to mainstream economic theory, incentives are a motivating factor for better 
performance on the part of the employee.  In a desire to maximize their utility by getting 
a bonus, employees will be willing to work harder and worker efficiency will increase.  
However, it has been argued that the use of incentives decreases trust within an 
organization because it signals to employees that managers do not believe them to be 
adequately self-motivated (Rigdon, 2006).  As a result, this lack of trust decreases worker 
productivity, yielding the opposite effect from the one predicted by the standard 
neoclassical model. Specifically, several studies have found that the introduction of 
incentives decreases performance in a variety of contexts (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a; 
Lepper and Greene, 1978; Deci and Ryan, 1999).  These findings have also been 
extended to situations involving punishments as incentives in social contracts (Gneezy 
and Rustichini, 2000b).  These studies consist of both field and laboratory experiments 
and indicate that workers’ trust in their employer might be a greater motivator for 
efficiency and productivity than monetary incentives. 
 The results of these studies indicate that neoclassical models of rational choice 
theory and expected utility might not be accurate predictors of people’s economic 
behavior in circumstances involving trust.  Instead of acting according to the predictions 
of rational choice theory, economic agents in a variety of contexts seem to trust others, be 
willing to pay for trust, and be willing to sacrifice monetary and other forms of utility in 
favor of trust.  This indicates that trust does play a role in economic interactions and a 
strong one at that.  However, the studies discussed so far have focused exclusively on 
microeconomic behavioral decision-making.  This prompts the question of whether these 
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findings aggregate and whether trust impacts economic interactions on a broader, 
macroeconomic scale?  
Impact of trust 
 Several studies have indicated that trust translates from individual behavioral 
decision making to macroeconomic changes through several mechanisms (Glaiser, 
Laibson & Sacerdote, 2002; Putnam 1993; La Porta, Lopez-de-Salanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Golding & Katz, 1999, Knack & Keefer, 1997).  One landmark study 
employed a cross sectional regression analysis to investigate the effect of societal trust 
levels on economic development (Knack & Keefer, 1997).  This study found that trust 
levels, as measured by the World Values Survey, are positively correlated with aggregate 
economic performance (Knack & Keefer, 1997).  In addition, the researchers found that 
this effect is stronger in poorer countries. They attributed this finding to national variation 
in trust levels, arguing that the effect is stronger in poorer countries because trust plays a 
larger role in facilitating economic interactions in economies that lack formal institutions 
and contract enforcement.  This stands in contrast to developed economies with more 
stable formal institutions in which contracts are more widely used in business interactions 
(Knack & Keefer, 1997).  The authors go on to discuss several mechanisms by which 
trust might impact macroeconomic performance.  One explanation they discuss for the 
connection between higher trust levels and higher growth rates involves protection and 
contract enforcement in economic transactions: 
Individuals in higher-trust societies spend less to protect 
themselves from being exploited in economic transactions 
[and]… are also likely to divert fewer resources to 
protecting themselves-through tax payments, bribes, or 
private security services and equipment-from unlawful 
(criminal) violations of their property rights. (p. 1252) 
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 13	  
  
 This explanation for the link between trust and economic growth implies that trust 
reduces costs of conducting business.  In this sense, at the macro level, trust between 
economic agents and institutions can be seen as an economic lubricant.  If individuals and 
firms devote fewer resources to protecting themselves from unforeseen negative 
outcomes, they will be able to divert more resources to productive endeavors.  As a 
result, the country will be able to accumulate more physical capital and increase 
production.  In the Solow growth model, a staple of neoclassical growth theory, physical 
capital accumulation is a key component of growth (Solow, 1956).  The aggregate 
production function for the model is shown below in which Y represents total output, K 
represents capital, L represents labor, A represents labor augmenting technology3, and   
is the elasticity of output with respect to capital.   𝑌 = 𝐾!(𝐴𝐿)!!! 
In addition, a country with higher trust levels and lower costs for protection will 
have a more attractive investment environment.  In poorer countries with low labor costs, 
a stable and secure investment environment might attract foreign investment, which 
would further increase capital accumulation.  Foreign investment has been implicated as 
a factor that has helped drive growth in some developing countries (DeMello, 1999).  In 
summation, trust levels might reduce costs and therefore increase growth by creating an 
environment more conducive to macro level investment and capital accumulation.   
 Another mechanism by which trust might increase growth is the development of 
informal markets. Institutions and infrastructure that support market systems in more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  A includes human, and in some interpretations social, capital because they effectively increase output per 
worker.	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developed countries are often lacking in developing countries.  This absence stunts 
economic growth by disallowing access to credit from formal institutions.  However, in 
societies with adequate levels of trust, informal credit sources can develop and become an 
important source of liquidity.  For example, informal credit sources play a big role in 
rural lending in many developing countries because of their relatively low transaction 
costs and fewer barriers to entry than formal institutions (Meier & Rauch, 2005).  Studies 
have also shown the presence of rotating credit associations, in which money is pooled 
and lent to a different family each time, in countries and cultures on every continent 
(Miracle, Miracle &Cohen, 1980; Putnam, 1993).  Similar to the lower protection costs 
associated with trust, access to liquidity through informal credit sources allows rural 
farmers to accumulate capital and increase productivity.  
 A third way in which micro trust levels could impact macroeconomic 
development has to do with investment horizons4.  Knack and Keefer (1997) argue that if 
government officials and policy makers are deemed trustworthy by economic agents then 
an investment environment conducive to long term planning will be more likely to 
develop.  In other words, policies pursued by central bankers and financial policy makers 
will be more stable and preplanned and will thus allow for long-term investment 
horizons.  Long-term investment horizons will once again encourage foreign direct 
investment and reduce transaction costs because businesses will not have to protect 
themselves from adverse and unforeseen fiscal and monetary policies.  As a result, 
physical capital accumulation will increase and spur economic growth.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Investment horizons refer to the length of time over which investors intend to hold on to, and plan for, an 
investment strategy. 
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 While these mechanisms have direct implications for physical capital 
accumulation, which drives short-term growth, societal trust levels may also have strong 
implications for returns to human capital.  According to the Solow Growth Model, long 
run growth is exogenously determined by technological progress (Solow, 1956).  This 
‘technological progress’ is comprised of many components, one of which is human 
capital (Solow, 1956).  If we operationalize human capital as the extent and quality of 
education, which is a widely used measure of human capital, there is a clear, albeit 
indirect, link between trust and human capital development.  Trust and civic norms such 
as fairness, reciprocity, and civic duty, have been positively correlated with better 
government institutions including the provision of public education (Putnam, 1997; 
Coleman 1988).   Additionally, in high trust societies, (compared to low trust societies) 
hiring will be based to a larger degree on credentials and education as opposed to ethnic, 
tribal, or family membership (Knack & Keefer, 1997).  This will increase the quality of 
hiring practices and result in a more productive labor force.  Higher payoffs to education 
will also create greater incentives to educational attainment and further drive long run 
growth.   
 In addition to these mechanisms of growth, a recent paper also found that higher 
trust levels are associated with lower economic volatility (Sangnier, 2013).  This can be 
linked to the attractive investment environment created in high trust societies.  Lower 
economic volatility will once again increase propensity to invest and adopt long-term 
investment horizons on the part of both domestic businesses and foreign firms.   
 The evidence presented here indicates that trust does in fact translate from 
microeconomic decision-making to macroeconomic growth in both the short and long 
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term.  This leads us to the next section, which discusses how societal trust should be 
evaluated in light of these findings.  
Implications of trust 
 Interpersonal trust seems to significantly affect growth by reducing transaction 
costs, providing a stable investment environment, and increasing returns to human capital 
investment.  The importance of trust is underscored by research indicating the existence 
of a low-trust poverty  trap, in which sufficiently low trust levels result in such low 
investment levels that growth is impossible (Zak & Knack, 2001).  In addition, trust 
levels do seem to vary significantly across nations and cultures on both a micro and 
macro level5.  For example, when the Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) trust study was 
carried out in different cultures, the experiment yielded different results in terms of both 
trust and reciprocity (Camerer, 2003).  For example, when the experiment was carried out 
in Kenya with Orma herders, average trust was around 40% of the endowment and 
average return was only around 55% of the amount invested (Ensminger, 2000).  In 
contrast, when the trust game was replicated with German subjects, the average amount 
invested was around 60% of the endowment and the average return was 110% (Jacobson 
& Sadrieh, 1996; Willinger, Lohman & Usunier, 1999).  Additionally, in their cross-
sectional analysis, Knack and Keefer (1997) found significant differences in macro-level 
trust between countries. 
 With evidence indicating that trust is a strong determinant of growth and that trust 
varies significantly among countries, how do we evaluate the real effects of trust on 
economic performance within a given nation?  In order to answer this question we can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Micro level trust behavior is measured through experiments such as the Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) 
study.  Macro level trust is generally measured through surveys that have much larger, and more 
representative, samples, such as the World Values Survey data used by Knack and Keefer (1997). 
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turn to a basic model of aggregate supply and demand.  Assuming a situation where trust 
levels decline, transaction costs should increase in the short run, impacting aggregate 
demand by making both producers and consumers less likely to engage in transactions 
due to increased cost.  Thus, lower levels of trust could be seen as a tax on transactions in 
the short run, resulting in a downward shift of the aggregate demand curve.  
Alternatively, an increase in societal trust levels could be seen as a subsidy to 
transactions resulting in an upward shift of the aggregate demand curve and greater 
output. 
  In the long run, a decrease in trust levels, which translate to a decrease in social 
capital, will reduce returns to human capital.  As a result, educational attainment will 
decline and the country will experience a brain drain as educated individuals immigrate 
to countries where they receive higher returns to their existing education.   
 In conclusion, this chapter posits that trust plays an integral role in economic 
growth.  In contrast to neoclassical conceptions of rationality, people do seem to trust 
others in micro-level economic transactions.  This trust behavior in turn translates into 
significant positive benefits for economic growth and stability.  Specifically, societal trust 
levels have been implicated in stimulating both short run and long run growth by 
reducing transaction costs, providing a stable investment environment, and increasing 
returns to human capital investment.  Low levels of interpersonal trust must therefore be 
evaluated as a tax on economic transactions and policies should be put in place to 
facilitate the development of trust.  The policy implications of trust studies and 
motivating factors that generate trust on a macro level will be discussed in the conclusion 
of this thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
Emotions Theory 
 
 Psychological definitions of the term ‘emotion’ vary and no single definition has 
been agreed upon across the literature.  Research has indicated that psychologists differ in 
their definitions of emotion along several key dimensions (Izard, 2010).  These 
dimensions include the activators, structure, and functions of emotion as well as the 
connections between emotion and observed responses (Izard, 2010).  As a result, 
researchers tend to define emotions based on their individual analyses of the above 
emotion components and the specific emotions/types of emotions they are investigating 
(Izard, 2010; Gendron, 2010).   
The current research deals with emotions in the framework of economic decision-
making, which naturally narrows down the context in which we may operationalize 
emotions.  This chapter will review current literature on emotions in order to identify 
what an emotion is, how emotions are activated, how emotions are structured, and how 
emotions and observed reactions relate to one another.  The next chapter, which will deal 
with emotions in decision-making, will investigate the function of emotions in the 
context of the current research.   
Essentially, this chapter aims to give an overview of the basic components of 
emotion and argue for certain emotion theories which apply most directly to the current 
study in order to come up with a working definition for emotions.  
What are emotions? 
At the basic level, an emotion is an affective experience.  There has been much 
debate in emotion psychology on how affective experiences, which in their simplest 
terms are classified in terms of positive and negative feelings, can be categorized.  The 
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current consensus among emotions researchers seems to be that affective traits can be 
separated into three distinct categories, emotional traits, moods, and emotions 
(Kahneman, 1999; Ekkekakis, 2013; Rosenberg, 1998; McCullough, Emmons & Tsang, 
2004; Ekman, 1994).  In order to understand what an emotion is we must first understand 
how psychologists differentiate emotions from other affective experiences. 
 The most basic affective category is that of emotional traits.  These traits consist 
of general emotional states of being that persist across time and in different situations 
(Athota & O’Connor, 2014; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989).  These traits are expressed as 
recurring tendencies in an individual’s life.  In other words a person with a certain 
emotional trait will display this trait consistently in a variety of situations.  In addition, 
possessing such a trait would lower one’s threshold for experiencing an emotional state 
with similar valence and arousal characteristics (Edmondson, Shaffer, Chaplin, Burg, 
Stone & Schwartz, 2013; Rosenberg, 1998).  For example, a hostile emotional trait would 
predispose an individual to experience anger and this person’s psychological profile 
would closely resemble that of an angry individual, even in the absence of an anger-
inducing stimulus (Edmondson, et al., 2013).  
 The second category of affective experiences is mood.  In contrast to emotional 
traits, moods do not persist across large portions of a person’s life.  Instead they are 
affective experiences that last for a set period of time but are not focused on a particular 
cause and are not context-dependent (Ekkekakis, 2013; Watson & Tellegen, 1985).  In 
addition, they generally appear and dissipate slowly and without defining circumstances 
(Ekkekakis, 2013).  Moods are stronger affective experiences than emotional traits but 
sill lack a distinct causal focus. 
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 The third category of affective experience is emotion.  Emotions are generally 
shorter than moods, usually have a direct causal factor and have a defined starting and 
ending point (Ekkekakis, 2013, Ekman, 1992; Schwarz, 2010).  They are characterized 
by a sharper onset and a shorter duration time than moods (Schwarz, 2010).   
 These three categories cover the basic spectrum of affective experiences.  Within 
these categories, emotions seem to be distinct from other affective experiences based on 
their intensity and duration as well as their elicitation.  Specifically, emotions have a 
concrete external stimulus that facilitates elicitation of the emotion.  Now that we have 
covered how emotions differ from other types of affect, we will investigate the structure 
of emotions. 
How are emotions structured? Discrete and constructionist theories 
The classical view of emotional structures is that of discrete or basic emotions6. 
According to these theories, emotions are distinct, separate entities that are genetically 
encoded and linked to unique physiological and behavioral responses (Clore & Ortony, 
2008; Ekman, 1992).  For example, this view would posit that anger would have a unique 
set of characteristics such as facial display (scowling), cardiovascular response (increased 
heart-rate), and skin conductance response, and that this set of responses would be 
significantly different from the pattern of responses denoting fear. 
The most substantive evidence for basic emotions theory comes from research 
conducted in New Guinea with a pre-literate cultural-linguistic group (Ekman & Friesen, 
1971).  In this study, researchers read a story and showed pictures of faces expressing 
different emotions to participants from this ethnic group in New Guinea (Ekman & 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Basic emotion theory and discrete emotion theory are used interchangeably here; previous reviews of the 
literature have indicated that these terms are synonymous (Barrett, 2006). 
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Friesen, 1971).  Participants were then asked which face portrayed the emotion that 
matched the emotion in the story (Ekman & Friesen, 1971).  Results indicated that 
participants from this preliterate culture were as adept at judging emotions based on 
facial expressions as participants from literate Western cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 
1971).  Due to the fact that participants from this preliterate culture had had very limited 
exposure to western culture and mass media prior to the study, their ability to recognize 
Western facial expressions indicates that some emotions may be basic or universal. This 
makes a strong argument for the existence of emotions as distinct, genetically encoded, 
entities because it suggests that they are universal and clearly distinguishable by 
behavioral (facial) expression.   
Other evidence for discrete emotion theory comes from studies on neurochemical 
processes (Panksepp, 1998), nervous system activity (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 
1983; Levenson, 2002), and vocal expressions (Scherer, Johnstone, & Klasmeyer, 2003).  
For example, in one study, researchers induced six emotions (surprise, disgust, anger, 
sadness, fear, and happiness) in participants using directed facial action and relived 
emotion tasks7.  Researchers then measured participants’ physiological responses such as 
heart rate, skin temperature, skin conductance, and muscular contraction (Ekman, 
Levenson, & Friesen, 1983).  Results indicated that physiological responses were 
significantly different between each of the negative emotions and between positive and 
negative emotions (Ekman, Levenson, & Friesen, 1983).  This work provides support for 
discrete emotions theory by indicating that these six basic emotions have distinct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The directed facial action task involved asking participants to activate certain facial muscles that 
replicated a facial expression congruent to a certain emotion (i.e., contracting the fact into a scowl in the 
anger condition), researchers did not mention the actual emotions during the manipulation.  In the relived 
emotion task, participants were asked to relive a previous emotional experience that was congruent with 
emotion being induced.  
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physiological responses that are common across the participant sample.  Thus, each 
emotion has a unique set of observed responses associated with it, creating a discrete 
category and natural boundaries between emotions.  
The extensive literature supporting basic emotions has provided a fairly 
convincing argument for this model of emotion structure.  However, in the 1990’s, 
researchers began to criticize discrete emotion theory and found evidence supporting 
constructionist models8 of emotion structure (Levenson, 2002).   
Constructionist models of emotion argue that emotions do not exist as entirely 
discrete and clearly separate entities (Colombetti, 2009).  They question the argument 
made by basic emotions theorists of the existence of a direct relationship between 
specific emotions and specific, concrete, physiological and behavioral responses 
(Colombetti, 2009).  Instead, constructionist models argue that emotions are loosely 
organized, fluid, situation-dependent responses to external stimuli and that boundaries 
between different emotions are far more flexible (Russell & Barrett, 1999; Barrett, 2006; 
Russell, 2006; Sabini & Silver, 2005; Barret, Gendron & Huang, 2009; Lindquist, Siegel, 
Quigley & Barrett, 2013; Barrett, 2011; Barrett, Lindquist, Bliss-Moreau, et al., 2007; 
Lindquist, Wager, Bliss-Moreau, Kober, & Barrett, 2012; Kirkland & Cunningham, 
2012).  Furthermore, they argue that basic emotional dimensions of valence and arousal 
are the only inherent emotional characteristics and specific emotions arise from these 
dimensions in a situational and context dependent manner (Barrett, 2006).  Essentially, 
this theoretic framework asserts that emotions are semantically derived and culture-
specific due to their loosely organized nature and are not cross cultural or universal.  In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Constructionist models have also been called dimensional models in recent literature; these terms are 
synonymous (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013). 
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other words, emotions would be differentiated because fear would result from negative 
valence and high arousal in a threatening situation as opposed to sadness, which would 
result from negative valence and low arousal in the context of loss or regret. 
One of the fundamental arguments against discrete emotion theory stems from 
studies indicating that measureable responses that are assumed to result from a given 
emotion are typically weakly correlated (Barret, Gendron & Huang, 2009; Barrett, 2006).  
In other words, measures such as facial movements, vocal signals, and physiological 
arousal for a given emotion, such as anger, will have little correlation both within and 
between measures (Barrett, 2006).  Therefore, contrary to discrete emotion theory, a 
single emotion does not yield a consistent set of measurable responses across a group of 
participants.  
A recent review of Lench, Flores and Bench’s (2011) meta-analysis of emotion 
literature indicates that effect sizes for physiological responses to different emotions are 
exceedingly small (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013).  Additionally, the meta-
analysis revealed that, “The only consistently significant differences (with moderate 
effect sizes) across pairwise comparisons of negative emotion inductions…were observed 
for self-reported emotional experience.” (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013 p. 
258).  This evidence supports the constructionist view that emotions are constructs of 
culture, language, and situational variables and only exists on a spectrum composed of 
arousal and valence (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013). 
A recent study on discrete emotions attempted a reproduction of Ekman and 
Friesen’s (1983) experiment (Gendron, Barrett, van der Vyver & Roberson, 2014).  Two 
participant groups, one from the U.S. and one from the Himba ethnic group in Namibia, 
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were asked to sort pictures of faces portraying different emotions into groups based on 
the emotions portrayed (Gendron, Barrett, van der Vyver & Roberson, 2014).  The results 
of this study found that Himba participants sorted the stimuli differently from American 
participants and that they used behavioral terms (i.e, laughter) to describe emotions rather 
than the mental terms (i.e., happiness) which American participants used (Gendron, 
Barrett, van der Vyver & Roberson, 2014).  These results indicate that emotions might 
not be genetically encoded, distinct, categories, but are instead perceived through a 
cultural lens.  Additionally, the researchers posit that the results reported by Ekman and 
Friesen (1983) supporting basic emotion theory might be a product of the experimental 
design they used in which emotion concepts (the stories participants were told) were used 
to structure the perception of the stimuli (pictures of faces) before participants completed 
the emotion identification task (Gendron, Barrett, van der Vyver & Roberson, 2014). 
In addition to physiological and behavioral evidence for constructionist models, 
as opposed to discrete emotion theory, several linguistics-based experiments also seem to 
support constructionist models.  For example, one study utilizing semantic satiation 
(repeating a word until it loses meaning) showed that identification of emotions becomes 
more difficult following a semantic satiation exercise (Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, 
& Russell, 2006).  This indicates that contrary to discrete emotion theory emotional 
meaning might be derived from conceptual semantic sources, not distinct, genetically 
encoded emotional categories.  Neurological studies have also argued against discrete 
emotions by citing that emotion elicitation is linked to multiple brain regions, and is thus 
not confined to distinct neurological processes for each emotion (Barrett, 2006).   
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 A review of the current literature indicates a shift in models of emotion from 
traditional discrete emotion theory to a constructionist theory of emotion structure.  At 
the basic level, constructionist models evaluate emotions on the foundation of valence 
(positive or negative) and arousal (high arousal or low arousal).  For example, anger is an 
emotion with negative valence and high arousal whereas sadness is an emotion with 
negative valence and low arousal and happiness is an emotion with positive valence and 
high arousal (Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley & Barrett, 2013).  The experience of these 
emotions is framed by cultural, experiential, and situational factors and lack distinct 
universal boundaries.  This thesis will adopt the basic constructionist view of emotion 
structure as a theoretical basis for the current research.  
It is important to note that as Clore and Ortony (2008) state,  
If (constructionist views are) confirmed, such observations 
would not necessarily make specific emotions any less 
important, powerful, or universal. They would simply 
change the locus and nature of their distinctiveness. In such 
a view, what makes emotions universal is not their 
biological status, but the situations to which they are 
responses. (p. 3) 
 
Thus, the constructionist view of emotions utilized in the current research does 
not diminish the validity of using specific emotions (anger and happiness in this study) in 
an experimental design; it simply increases the situational factors as relevant variables in 
structuring the induced emotion.  Now that we have investigated how emotions are 
structured, we will turn to an investigation of emotion elicitation. 
Emotion elicitation and appraisal theories 
At the basic level, an emotion is a reaction to an external stimulus (Clore & 
Ortony, 2008).  Traditionally, psychologists have argued that the link between an external 
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stimulus and an emotion experience is realized through an emotional appraisal, an 
evaluative, cognitive, judgment about a situation or context (Clore & Ortony, 2008).  In 
other words the classical view asserts that, when confronted with a situation, people 
engage unconscious cognition to evaluate what this situation means for them, and what 
kind of situation it is (threatening, positive, etc.,) and the emotion follows as a result of 
this cognitive appraisal (Lazarus, 1994).   
In recent years, perceptual theorists have contested this classical cognitive view of 
appraisal theory.  Perceptual theorists claim that basic emotion elicitation bypasses any 
sort of implicit cognitive analysis.  In other words, a situation can elicit an emotional 
reaction such as fear before the unconscious cognitive mechanisms perceive why the 
situation is scary (Clore & Ortony, 2008).  Parkinson states “the minimal precondition for 
anger is simply resistance stopping us from getting through,” (2007, p. 21).  Thus, 
perceptual models assert that an external stimulus can elicit an emotional reaction 
automatically, bypassing cognitive appraisal of a situation. 
Evidence for perceptual models of emotion elicitation stem from the idea that 
individuals might perceive emotion too quickly for cognitive appraisal to be activated.  
One study investigated this possibility by comparing reaction times for inferring 
appraisals versus inferring emotion reactions (Siemer & Reisenzein, 2007).  Participants 
were given one sentence scenarios intended to be congruent to certain emotion 
experiences (i.e., ‘you are careless at work, a colleague gets hurt’ would correlate to 
guilt) (Siemer & Reisenzein, 2007).  Participant reactions times were then measured for 
answers to questions about the emotion inference (guilt) or appraisal dimensions such as 
the valence, morality, importance, and focus of the sentence (Siemer & Reisenzein, 
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2007).  The results of this study find that the emotion judgments occurred significantly 
faster than the appraisal judgments.  This study provides some support for perceptual 
models of appraisal by suggesting that people might be faster to infer emotions than 
appraisals and thus the emotion elicitation process could involve automatic components 
that bypass cognitive appraisal in order to elicit an emotional experience.  
In response to this reaction time study, cognitive appraisal theorists have argued 
that cognitive appraisals occur at the subconscious level and that emotion inferences in 
themselves are dependent on extracting relational appraisal-based information 
(Parkinson, 2007).  Additionally, one study employed a series of experiments that tested 
whether evaluations of an emotional stimulus would be impacted by the valence (positive 
or negative) of a subconsciously presented, not emotionally charged, prime (Moors & 
DeHower, 2001).  The results of this study indicated that positive or negative appraisals 
of a prime do in fact impact emotional inferences (Moors & DeHower, 2001).  These 
findings support the existence of automatic appraisals and indicate that there is no reason 
to believe that emotion reactions occur more quickly than cognitive appraisals of a 
situation. 
The differing viewpoints relating to the cognitive basis of emotion appraisals have 
resulted in several appraisal models.  These models range from the perceptual theorists 
automaticity models to multiple models that combine cognitive and perceptual 
approaches of appraisal.  At the basic level, these models suggest that in some cases, such 
as with low-level affective reactions or in the presence of familiar emotional stimuli, 
affective responses bypass cognitive mechanisms (Clore & Ortony, 2008).  On the other 
hand, they assert that in other situations, such as in the case of full-blown emotional 
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reactions or a novel and complicated external stimulus, cognitive appraisals are the basis 
of emotion elicitation (Clore & Ortony, 2008).   
Following a review of appraisal literature, it seems that dual-process models, 
involving both cognitive and perceptual appraisal components, have the most empirical 
support.  Within the realm of dual process models, researchers have proposed different 
mechanisms by which the processes of emotion elicitation interact and produce 
observable behavior.  These include sequential, chaotic, recursive, and single-network 
models of emotional appraisal (Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Cunningham & Zelazo, 
2007; Ortony, Norman & Revelle, 2005).  However, the details of these models often find 
ambiguous and mixed empirical support and the debate on which of these models holds 
the most weight has proven inconclusive.  This research will therefore ascribe to a basic 
dual-process model of emotional appraisal, which will be further discussed in the 
framework of appraisal utilized as a theoretical basis for the experimental design in 
chapter five.  Now that we have reviewed how emotions are elicited and the mechanisms 
of cognitive appraisal, the next section will review literature on how emotions relate to 
observed responses. 
Emotions and observed reactions: Emergence model vs. latent-trait model 
Psychological inquiry into emotions is inherently limited by the fact that no direct 
examination of emotional experience is possible.  Instead, psychologists must rely on the 
behaviors linked to emotional experience for insight into emotions.  These behaviors 
include physiological, neurological, and behavioral expressions of emotional experience.   
The classical psychological view of the relationship between emotion experience 
and emotion expression is that elicitation produces emotion experience, which produces 
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the expression.  Recently, however, some researchers have argued against the notion that 
an emotion experience results in behavioral and physiological responses.  Instead, these 
theorists argue that the convalescence of physiological and behavioral responses to an 
external stimulus result in an emotion experience (Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2006; Clore 
& Centerbar, 2004; Clore & Ortony, 2000).  In other words, instead of fear causing us to 
tremble, these theorists argue that trembling causes us to fear.  This theory is known as 
the emergence model, as opposed to the traditional view, which is known as the latent-
trait model (Clore & Ortony, 2008).   
 The traditional latent-trait model posits that an emotion can be experienced 
regardless of whether one expresses it through neurological, physiological, and 
behavioral means (Clore & Ortony, 2008).  In contrast, the emergence model asserts that 
an emotion only exists as a result of the expression of that emotion across multiple 
systems in the body (i.e., behavior, nervous system arousal, and neurochemical changes) 
(Clore & Ortony, 2008). 
 In relation to the discrete and constructionist models of emotion structure 
discussed earlier in this chapter, the latent-trait model of emotions naturally fits with 
discrete emotions theory and the emergence model relates to constructionist approaches 
to emotion structure (Lindquist, 2013).  This is because the emergence model theorizes 
that emotions relate to observed behaviors by ‘emerging’ from underlying affect and 
situational contexts. In essence, the physiological, neurological, and behavioral responses 
arise from underlying affective dimensions (i.e., valence and arousal) and these observed 
behaviors constitute the experience of an emotion (Lindquist, 2013).  In contrast, the 
latent-trait/discrete emotions nexus argues that genetically coded, distinct emotions with 
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specific boundaries can be experienced and result in observable behaviors (Lindquist, 
2013).  Representations of the discrete emotion/latent-trait and the 
constructionist/emergence models of emotion can be found in the flow charts below. 
 Validation of the emergence model through empirical findings is difficult because 
the model is purely theoretical.  Essentially, it exists as a way of viewing the relationship 
between emotions and observable reactions in light of new constructionist theories of 
emotion structure.  As a result, data supporting constructionist views of emotion structure 
are often used to support the emergence model conceptualization of the link between 
emotions and observed behaviors. 
 
A representation of the discrete emotion/latent-trait models of emotion: 
 
 
A representation of the constructionist/emergent models of emotion9: 
 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to define the term emotion by investigating three 
emotional dimensions that have been debated in the recent literature.  At the basic level, 
it seems that an emotion is an affective experience that has a specific starting and ending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Both of these representations assume the existence of appraisal prior to emotion experience/ observable 
reactions, this view is not shared by psychologists who do not agree with the cognitive appraisal or dual 
process models described in the previous section. 
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point and lasts for a set period of time.  Furthermore, according to constructionist theories 
of emotion, emotions are entities that arise from underlying affective dimensions such as 
valence and arousal and are situation and context dependent.  Emotions are elicited as the 
result of an external stimulus either through a cognitive appraisal or as a direct reaction to 
the stimulus.  Finally, emotions seem to exist as the result of constituent factors including 
physiological, neurological, and behavioral reactions to an external stimulus.  Now that 
we have come up with a working definition for emotions, the next chapter will review 
literature on the function of emotion within the framework of this study; emotion’s 
impact on decision-making.  
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Chapter 4 
Emotions in Decision-Making and Economics 
  
In chapter three, we reviewed psychological literature on emotion theory and 
reached a working definition of emotion by analyzing the basic components of affective 
experience.  This chapter will extend this conceptualization of emotion by investigating 
the effect of emotion on judgment and decision-making, with a specific focus on 
economic decision-making.  The research reviewed here will evaluate psychological 
frameworks for integrating emotions and judgment and decision-making research in 
addition to delving further into behavioral economics research that applies to these fields. 
Emotions in judgment and decision-making: Theoretical framework 
 The synthesis of emotion theory in social psychology and the field of judgment 
and decision-making originally emerged within a cognitive framework during the 1970’s.  
This cognition approach to emotional decision-making yielded two major frameworks for 
investigating the impact of affect on judgment.  The first of these is the priming 
framework, which asserts that positive and negative moods activate positive and negative 
information and the accessibility of each of these affective states influences how 
judgments are made (Bower, 1981; Isen, Shalker, Clark & Karp, 1972; Mayer, Gaschke, 
Braverman, & Evans, 1992; Mayer, Gayle, Meehan, & Haarman, 1990). 
 This priming account provided a solid theoretical basis but eventually evolved 
and expanded into the second framework, the Affect as Information Hypothesis.  In 
comparison to the priming account, the Affect as Information Hypothesis posits that 
affective states are evaluated as cues about how an individual feels about a given 
situation.  In other words, while making a decision, any emotions experienced at that time 
would be evaluated as a relevant piece of information regarding the decision at hand 
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(Clore, 1992; Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 2003).  This 
perspective suggests that individuals implicitly understand that emotional states are a 
reflection of cues in their surroundings and that this in turn impacts how they perceive 
their environment. 
In recent years, the Affect as Information Hypothesis was further expanded to 
include a processing style perspective, which essentially generalized the original 
hypothesis to include moods and emotional traits (these affective traits are discussed in 
chapter three).  However, the experimental design in the current research, which will be 
presented in chapters five and six, focuses exclusively on fully experienced emotions (not 
emotional traits or moods).  As a result, we will rely on the basic Affect as Information 
Hypothesis to serve as a theoretical foundation for the effect of emotions on judgment 
and decision-making.   
The Affect as Information Hypothesis proposes that differences in how people 
evaluate emotional input in a decision is based on their appraisal of the emotion.  In this 
case, due to the decision-making required following the emotional appraisal, the appraisal 
tendencies will follow a cognitive framework discussed in chapter three.  Research has 
found that the cognitive appraisals that relate specifically to the Affect as Information 
Hypothesis are influenced by two main appraisal tendencies.  The first, and most basic, is 
the positive or negative valence of the appraisal.  This is what differentiates emotions 
such as anger and sadness from excitement and happiness. 
Many studies have investigated the differential impact of positive emotions on 
decision-making as compared with negative emotions.  At the basic level, research 
indicates that positive emotions broaden the scope of attention and engage heuristic top-
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down processing10 and negative emotions narrow the scope of attention and engage 
bottom-up, detail oriented processing11 (Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wolk, 
1996; Bless, 2001; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Forgas, 1998; 
Park & Banaji, 2000).  In one study, researchers used film clips to induce emotion and 
then measured scope of attention and thought-action repertoire (Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005).  Results indicated that positive emotions such as amusement and contentment 
broaden the scope of attention and thought-action repertoire and negative emotions such 
as anger and anxiety narrow the scope of attention and thought-action repertoire 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005).  
Similarly, another study used two experiments to “test the hypothesis that happier 
moods promote a greater focus on the forest and sadder moods a greater focus on the 
trees,” (Gasper & Clore, 2002, p. 34).  In these experiments, affect was induced using a 
self-directed writing task (Gasper & Clore, 2002).  Participants were then asked to view a 
picture for 15 seconds and then draw it from memory.  Raters who were blind to the 
condition then coded these drawings and results indicated that participants in the happy 
emotion group were more likely to organize their drawings by global concepts (indicating 
top-down processing) (Gasper & Clore, 2002).  Additionally, the second experiment 
indicated that, when asked to match shapes based on similarity to a stimulus, participants 
experiencing positive emotions tended to sort them based on global forms rather than 
details (Gasper & Clore, 2002). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Heuristics are quick information processing rules that individuals employ to make judgments and 
decisions.  Top-down processing refers to conceptually driven processing in which individuals form 
perceptions based on a larger concept or idea before working down to the details. 11	  Bottom-up processing refers to processing that starts with small details and works up to a general 
concept or idea.	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The results of these studies indicate that positive emotions tend to impact 
judgment and decision-making by inducing people to broaden their scope of attention and 
engage in superficial analyses of information and that negative emotions induce people to 
narrow their scope of attention and focus on details.  Additional research has also 
indicated that positive emotions induce people to rely more on heuristics and preexisting 
schema such as racial stereotypes (Park & Banaji, 2000).  This body of research fits in 
with the Affect as Information Hypothesis by indicating that people tend to incorporate 
emotions into their judgments and decision-making differentially based on valence 
appraisals.   
The second appraisal tendency that has strong implications for the decision-
making process is that of certainty.  Certainty regarding a situation and an emotional 
stimulus has a pronounced impact on how individuals make decisions.  Certainty-
associated emotions such as anger, disgust, contentedness, and happiness have been 
linked to confidence about how to act in a given situation and what decision to make 
(Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  On the other hand, low-certainty appraisals, leading to 
emotions such as sadness, hope, and fear, result in ambiguity and lack of confidence in 
the decision-making process.  In other words, high-certainty appraisals produce emotions 
that give more insight and direction on the decision-making process and what judgments 
to make.  In the framework of the Affect as Information Hypothesis, high-certainty 
emotions would thus have more of an impact on the decision-making process than low-
certainty emotions because they would be perceived as more relevant ‘information.’ 
Multiple studies have indicated the importance of certainty appraisals to judgment 
and decision-making.  For example, anger, an emotion linked with high-certainty 
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appraisals, seems to induce people to report lower probabilities of anticipating a negative 
outcome from a situation (Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).  Lerner 
and Keltner (2001) induced anger (high-certainty) and fear (low-certainty) in a group of 
participants and then asked them to estimate the likelihood of suffering from various 
diseases. Those in the (high-certainty) anger condition reported significantly lower 
estimates than those in the (low-certainty) fear condition (Lerner & Keltner, 2001).  
Similarly, Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fishhoff (2003) found that, in a study conducted 
after 9/11, angry participants estimated lower probabilities of future terrorist attacks than 
fearful participants.  In addition to affecting probability judgments, research has also 
indicated that high-certainty emotions led to increased use of top-down processing, 
heuristic thinking, stereotyping, and over-confidence in personal abilities (Tiedens & 
Linton).  These studies all indicate that, in addition to valence-based primary appraisal 
tendencies, certainty-based secondary appraisal tendencies also significantly affect 
judgments and decision-making.  Specifically, positive and high-certainty emotions seem 
to generally induce heuristic thinking and top-down processing.  In contrast, negative 
low-certainty emotions seem to induce reasoning-based, bottom-up processing.  
Furthermore, because of the feelings of confidence and decisiveness associated with 
high-certainty emotional appraisals, these emotions are more likely to impact the 
decision-making process.   
The research reviewed here regarding the Affect as Information Hypothesis and 
certainty appraisals complements a theoretical framework presented in the Affect 
Infusion model.  While the Affect as Information Hypothesis deals with how emotions 
will impact decision-making, the Affect Infusion Model deals with when, or under what 
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circumstances, emotions are most likely to impact decision making.  According to the 
Affect Infusion Model, emotions impact cognitive processes when individuals engage in 
higher level substantive thinking (Forgas, 1995).  Thus, the decision-making process is 
affected by emotions if it is a complex, novel, decision that requires constructive 
processing (Forgas, 1995).  When an individual faces a simple decision that preexisting 
knowledge, or heuristics, can be applied to, emotions generally have a smaller impact on 
his or her cognition.  
The Affect Infusion Model has extensive support from a number of studies in the 
social psychology literature (i.e., Greifender, Bless, & Pham, 2011; Kosnes, Pothos, & 
Tapper, 2010; Noda, Takai, & Yoshida, 2007; Lerner, Goldberg & Tetlock, 1998; Clore, 
Gasper & Garvin, 2001; Forgas 1993a; Forgas, 1993b).  In one seminal study that served 
as a foundation for the model, researchers measured participants’ judgments of typical or 
atypical couples following an emotion induction task (Forgas, 1993a).  Results indicated 
that when faced with a novel situation (an atypical couple), the valence of participants’ 
affective state had a significantly greater impact on their judgments (Forgas, 1993a).  
These findings support the Affect Infusion Model’s assertion that affect will have a 
greater impact on decision-making when the decision-maker is confronted with a novel 
(atypical) decision. 
In a more recent study, researchers asked participants in six different conditions to 
make product evaluations (Noda, Takai, & Yoshida, 2007).  In addition to the emotion 
conditions (happy and sad), these conditions included a time pressure/ no time pressure 
condition and a complete/ incomplete information condition (Noda, Takai, & Yoshida, 
2007).  The Affect Infusion Model framework would suggest that emotions would impact 
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decision making most when participants would have to use the greatest cognitive capacity 
to make a decision (Forgas, 1995).  The results of this study support the model by 
indicating that emotions tended to have a greater impact on decision-making when 
participants faced cognitive constraints (time-pressure) and had to engage greater 
cognitive processing (more information).   
The research reviewed here indicates that, based on certainty appraisals and the 
Affect Infusion Model, emotions would be most likely to impact decision-making when 
an individual is faced with a unique, complicated decision, and is experiencing high-
certainty emotions such as anger or happiness.  In combining the Affect as Information 
Hypothesis and the Affect Infusion Model, we have a complete framework for analyzing 
both when and how emotions will impact decision making.  Now that this framework has 
been established, the question becomes; how does this framework apply to economic 
decision-making?  The rest of this chapter will address this question and review the 
literature on emotions and economics.   
Emotions in economic decision-making 
 When it comes to decision-making, neoclassical economics has been dominated 
by consequentialist models based on expected utility theory and rational choice (Rick & 
Loewenstein, 2008).  This decision-making theory incorporates probabilistic utility 
functions into the decision framework of rational economic agents12(von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944).  While these models have not directly addressed emotional reactions 
within the decision-making process, expected utility theory and rational choice theory do 
make allowances for some types of emotional influences.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See chapter 2 for an overview of neoclassical rationality assumptions and the axioms of expected utility 
theory as well as behavioral critiques of these theories. 	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 In relation to decision-making, emotions can be categorized into three basic 
groups.  These include expected emotions, immediate integral emotions, and immediate 
incidental emotions (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008).  The first of these groups, expected 
emotions, can generally be incorporated into neoclassical models of decision-making.  
These are emotions that are experienced concurrently with the outcome of a decision.  In 
other words when an individual makes the choice to take a gamble and ends up winning 
$100, they experience happiness as a result of this payoff.  With expected emotions, the 
decision maker is cognitively aware of the potential for emotional reaction at the time of 
the decision outcome, but does not actively experience an emotion during the decision 
making process.  Thus, expected emotions do not actively incorporate an emotional 
influence on the decision-making process itself and are implicitly accepted in 
neoclassical decision models. 
 The second emotion group, immediate integral emotions, refers to emotions that 
are experienced when a decision-maker anticipates the possible outcomes of different 
choices (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008).  In other words, when making a decision, the 
emotional valence of different payoffs and outcomes (such as happiness from winning 
$100) will elicit an emotional reaction, at the time the decision is being made, based on 
expectation.  In some neoclassical models, these emotions are also considered rational in 
that they are indicators of the potential utility associated with different outcomes.   
 The third emotion group, immediate incidental emotions, is considered 
completely irrational under neoclassical assumptions.  Incidental emotions are emotional 
states that are unrelated to a given decision but still influence the decision-making 
process (Rick & Loewenstein, 2008).  An example of this would be something like a 
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CEO being angry because he spilled his coffee and this anger influencing his decision-
making process in firing an employee.  These emotions are inherently irrational because, 
by definition, they are irrelevant to the decision-making process or its potential outcomes.   
 The work of this thesis will focus on incidental emotions in particular due to their 
extreme violation of traditional perceptions of rational decision making.  However, the 
remainder of this chapter will investigate ways in which all three of these emotion groups 
have been found to impact the functioning of the economy. 
Emotions and economics 
 Some of the most interesting research on the link between emotions and 
economics takes a neuropsychological approach that illustrates the importance of 
emotions to economic decision-making.  For example, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and 
Damasio (1997), conducted a study that investigated the role of subconscious expected 
emotions in decision-making.  Two groups of participants, one normal group and one 
group with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex played a money-based card 
game (Bechara et al., 1997).  In this game participants selected cards from four decks, 
two of the card decks were risky and disadvantageous in the long run, and two of the card 
decks were safe and advantageous in the long run (Bechara et al., 1997).  The normal 
participant group experienced skin conductance responses (denoting a negative affective 
reaction) before selecting from the risky deck after several trials, this caused them to stick 
to the safe decks and win out in terms of monetary gains (Bechara et al., 1997).  The 
participant group with prefrontal cortex damage did not develop these physiological 
responses and ended up selecting from the risky decks and losing money in the long run 
(Bechara et al., 1997).   
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 These skin conductance responses indicated a subconscious negative affective 
reaction in preparation for a possible negative consequence of a decision (selecting a poor 
card and losing money) (Bechara et al., 1997).  This experiment indicated that the lack of 
emotional response, operationalized by damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
which plays a role in emotional processing of risk and fear, can lead to irrational 
decisions (picking from a risky deck with higher losses than gains).  Thus, an economic 
agent that is not subject to emotional responses would not be a rational actor in these 
circumstances.  This leads to several important inferences.  The first is that any economic 
model of decision making purporting rationality should factor in possible emotional 
influences because the absence of emotional cues results in adverse decisions. The 
second is that, perceptions of risk, which are one of the most important classes of 
economic decisions, are subject to the influence of immediate integral emotions.   
 Another set of studies on risk perceptions deals with incidental immediate 
emotions.  Johnson and Tversky (1983) conducted an experiment in which participants 
read news articles with either a positive or negative emotional valence.  Participants were 
then asked to estimate probabilities of dying in different circumstances such as car 
accidents; the group that read the negatively valenced articles estimated significantly 
higher risks of mortality in different circumstances (Johnson & Tversky, 1983).  These 
results were attributed to the emotion-inducing effects of reading the articles (Johnson & 
Tversky, 1983).  Thus, incidental emotions do seem to have a significant effect on how 
individuals judge risky choices, however, does this effect translate into macroeconomics 
in any significant way? 
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 Several studies suggest that financial markets show significant effects from 
emotion and indicate that these markets might be a mechanism by which affective 
responses impact the economy on a larger scale.  For example, using panel data, 
Hirschleifer and Shumway (2003), found a strong positive correlation between the 
amount of sunshine on a given day and stock market performance.  They cite studies 
indicating that sunshine is associated with upbeat mood to attribute this effect to 
emotions and go on to say that these findings are difficult to reconcile with rational price 
models (Hirschleifer & Shumway, 2003).  Similarly, Edmans, Garcia & Norli (2007) 
found a strong correlation between poor stock market performance and poor performance 
of a national sports team in an important competition (ie., World Cup).  They also 
attribute this effect to negatively valenced emotions due to the sports loss impacting 
investors’ equity valuations (Edmans, Garcia & Norli, 2007).   
 Many studies in behavioral finance have found stock market anomalies relating to 
emotions.  In addition to the ones described above, Monday effects, weekly effects, 
intraday effects, and January effects have also been documented and these trends have 
been shown to persist over long periods of time (Thaler, 1987).  These findings indicate 
that emotional influences on decision-making at the micro level do translate into the 
equity markets in ways that deviate significantly from rational choice and efficient 
market hypotheses.  These equity markets in turn affect macroeconomic functioning by 
affecting wealth, which impacts consumption, a key economic driver.  Additionally they 
impact macroeconomic trends by impacting valuations of existing equity compared to 
new capital stock (Tobin’s Q), which impacts investment levels (Akerlof, 2001). 
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Overall, the research reviewed here indicates that emotions have a significant 
impact on economics at both a micro and macro level.  Thus far we have reviewed the 
influence of trust on economics in chapter two and the influence of emotions on decision-
making and economics in chapters three and four.  The next chapter will synthesize these 
topics and look at a subfield of social psychology and behavioral economics relating 
emotions to trust.  This relationship will then be set within an economic framework. 
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Chapter 5 
Emotions and Trust 
  
 In recent years, several studies have investigated the impact of emotions on trust 
in an economic framework. These studies have generally approached this through the 
combined lens of social psychology and economics.  This approach has yielded several 
interesting results in regard to when and how emotional mechanisms impact trust and 
what this impact implies for economic performance.  This chapter will review the most 
prominent research on this topic and then introduce the experimental approach taken by 
the current study to investigate the effect of emotions on trust-based decision-making.  
Previous work on emotions and trust 
 In 2005, Dunn and Schweizer published the most direct investigation to date on 
the effects of emotions on trust.  In their paper, they reported findings from a series of 
studies that addressed the impact of discrete incidental emotions on unrelated trust 
evaluations.  These studies used emotion induction techniques (film clips or a directed 
writing task), which were followed by participants’ self-reported trust ratings.  One of the 
studies investigated anger, happiness, and sadness and found that these incidental 
emotions significantly impacted self-reported trust.  Specifically, the results indicated that 
positive valence emotions increased trust and negative valence emotions decreased trust, 
a finding that is consistent with the Affect as Information Hypothesis covered in chapter 
four.  In addition, they found that secondary control appraisals might moderate the 
influence of emotional valence on trust. 
 In another study, Dunn and Schweizer further investigated the role of control 
appraisals and found that emotions with other-person control (anger and gratitude) 
influenced trust significantly more than emotions with personal control (pride and guilt).  
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These control appraisals are closely linked, and may be seen as a component of, the 
certainty appraisals discussed in chapter four.  In other words, emotions with other person 
control (ie., a person/event responsible for the emotion), would have high certainty as to 
the object of the emotion and possible responses.  In the framework of the Affect as 
Information Hypothesis, emotions associated with a tangible external stimulus (other 
person control/high certainty) would be perceived as more relevant information.  In 
contrast, emotions with personal control, such as guilt and pride, have lower certainty due 
to their internal nature.  Such emotions leave ambiguity in regard to how to act in 
response to the emotional experience because they generally lack an external ‘other 
person’ stimulus or directive.  
 Thus, the results of this study by Dunn and Schweizer can be interpreted as 
indicating that incidental emotions with high certainty/other-person control appraisals 
will have the greatest impact on trust decisions.  Furthermore, the direction of the effect 
seems to be driven by the valence of the emotion; positive emotions increase trust while 
negative emotions decrease trust.   
 Other studies seem to support this valence-directed account of affective influences 
on trust.  For example, a more recent study also found that negative emotions decrease 
judgments of trust (Forgas & East, 2008).  In this study, participants were found to be 
more likely to judge a person as guilty, and distrust that person, if they were experiencing 
negative affect than if they were experiencing positive or neutral affect (Forgas & East, 
2008).   
Recently, Lount (2010) conducted a series of studies critiquing Dunn and 
Schweizer’s (2005) findings by showing that the effect of positive mood on trust is the 
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byproduct of heuristic processing associated with positive affect13.  In essence, Lount 
(2010) contends that, in Dunn and Schweizer’s study, participants were asked to evaluate 
trustworthiness of a coworker and that, in the positive mood condition, this led 
participants to enact a schema of a trustworthy coworker, which led to higher trust.  In 
effect, Lount argues for an intervening cognitive variable of top-down or heuristic 
processing which mediates the impact of emotions on trust.  
 Lount’s experiments seem to support this account of a mediating cognitive effect 
of heuristic thinking for positive affect due to both incidental situational factors and 
direct information about the trustee.  For example, in the first two experiments by Lount, 
interpersonal trust was compared to intergroup trust and it was found that, in a group 
setting, positive affect actually induced lower trust levels than neutral affect due to 
negative perceptions of outgroups.   
In the third and fourth experiments, positive or negative information on the trustee 
was combined with emotion manipulations for positive and neutral affect conditions 
(Lount, 2010).  Results indicated that there was a main effect for information on the 
trustee (positive information cues led to more trust) and that this effect was significant in 
the positive affect condition but not in the neutral affect condition (Lount, 2010).  These 
results indicate a relationship in which emotions do impact trust, but do so through 
heuristic thinking and cognitive analysis (e.g., evaluating positive/negative information 
on the trustee). 
 It is important to note that Lount (2010) only focused on positive emotions, so as 
of yet there is no indication that similar effects result from the connection between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  a	  review	  of	  the link between positive affect and heuristic thinking, see chapter four.	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negative emotions and bottom-up processing.  Additionally, it is likely that although this 
heuristic-thinking explanation does explain some of the variance in emotion-based trust, 
that there is also a direct effect of positive emotions on trust.  In fact, the dual-model 
approach of cognitive and perceptual appraisal presented in chapter three would strongly 
support the view that positive emotion impacts trust both through valence and through 
heuristic thinking.  Despite this, Lount (2010) does provide strong evidence for the 
possible impact of heuristic thinking on positive-emotion evaluations of trust.  This will 
be further discussed in the chapter eight of this thesis.   
In essence, these three studies (Dunn & Schweizer, 2005; Forgas & East, 2008; 
Lount, 2010) comprise the major recent developments in studying the impact of affect on 
trust.  The current research builds on these studies to investigate the role of emotions in 
trust behavior. 
The current study 
The current study will rely on a theoretical framework comparable to the one used 
by Dunn and Schwiezer (2005).  This framework utilizes the Affect as Information 
Hypothesis, the Affect Infusion Model, and the role of certainty appraisals to build a 
theory for when, how, and through what channels emotions would impact trust.  These 
theories are described in detail in chapter three and can be summarized in three parts.  
First, the Affect as Information Hypothesis asserts that emotions are synthesized as 
relevant pieces of information in the decision-making process.  This indicates that 
counter to rational choice models of decision-making, incidental emotions do impact 
decisions.  Second, the Affect Infusion Model asserts that emotions are more likely to 
impact decision-making when the decision-maker is faced with a novel decision 
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involving higher-order substantive thinking.  Finally, certainty appraisals indicate that 
emotions with high certainty, such as anger and happiness would be more likely to 
impact decision-making.   
While this study uses a similar theoretical framework to Dunn and Schweizer, it 
builds on previous studies and contributes to the existing literature in two ways.  The first 
is that this study will measure actual trust behavior as opposed to self-reported trust 
scores.  Thus, the experiment will investigate how people actually act when faced with a 
trust decision as opposed to how they say they will act.  This has the obvious benefit of 
reducing problems such as task demands that are inherent in self-reports in addition to 
measuring the conceptual variable of actual decision-making behavior more directly.  The 
second way in which this study contributes to the literature is that it introduces a post-
experimental survey to measure possible confounding demographic and personality-
based variables.  These include self-reported trust, empathy, risk, and attachment or 
feelings of belonging in a specific community (Bard College).  Of these, risk seems to be 
an especially relevant conceptual variable. The relationship between risk and trust, which 
is tested in the experiment, will be covered in detail in the discussion section.   
The research on emotions and trust presented here, in conjunction with the 
psychology and economics-based literature reviewed in the last four chapters, serve to 
inform the experimental design used in this study.  The current research was conducted at 
Bard College during January 2014.  The next chapter will cover the experimental design 
in detail and this will be followed by an analysis of the results and a discussion and 
conclusions section.   
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Chapter 6 
Method 
 
Overview 
The study utilized two experimental groups and a single control group in order to 
test the research hypotheses.  The study was presented to participants as two separate 
experiments.  This deception was necessary in order to maintain the internal validity of 
the study and avoid demand characteristics.  Demand characteristics refer to 
circumstances where participants are aware of the experimenter's hypotheses and change 
their behavior, consciously or unconsciously, to fit the predicted outcome.  Deception 
would thus minimize the systematic error in the experimental design and increase the 
internal validity.   
The first part of the experiment was a film-based emotion manipulation, which 
was used to induce anger and happiness in the experimental group or neutral affect in the 
control group.  The decision to focus on these two emotions (anger and happiness) stems 
from the theoretical foundation described in chapters four and five.  Three different film 
clips were used for each of the three conditions respectively.  The second part of the 
experiment involved a slightly modified version of the trust game originally proposed by 
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), which was intended to measure the trust behavior of 
the participants.   
The dependent variable was operationalized as the trust score from the trust game 
and the main independent variable was the emotion condition.  Based on the literature 
reviewed in chapters three, four, and five, I hypothesize that the anger condition would 
decrease trust scores and the happy condition would increase trust scores.  The neutral 
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condition serves as a baseline and I expect the trust scores of this group to fall somewhere 
between the other two conditions14.  These hypotheses are outlined below: 𝐻!.!:  𝜇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 < 𝜇𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐻!.!:  𝜇𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 < 𝜇ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 𝐻!.!:  𝜇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 < 𝜇ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦     
 𝐻!:  𝜇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 = 𝜇𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 𝜇ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 
 
After playing the trust game, participants filled out a questionnaire (see Appendix 
A) that collected demographic data as well as self-report measures of trust, risk, empathy, 
and attachment to the Bard community.  My secondary hypotheses were: (1) risk would 
be positively correlated with trust (i.e. higher propensity for risk taking would be 
associated with more trusting behavior), (2) empathy would be positively correlated with 
trust (i.e. higher levels of empathy would be associated with more trusting behavior), and 
(3) attachment to the Bard community would be positively correlated with trust (i.e. 
greater feelings of attachment or belonging within the Bard community would be 
associated with more trusting behavior). 
Participants 
 The Bard College Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved this study on 
November 11, 2013 and data were collected during the Citizen Science program at Bard 
College.  This is a required three-week program for freshman students during the month 
of January.  The participant pool consisted of 102 Bard College students, primarily from 
the class of 2017.  IRB materials and approval can be found in Appendix C. 
 The experiment was carried out in the President’s room at Kline Commons, the 
main dining hall of the campus.  The President’s room is a closed-off room adjacent to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Based on previous studies, I expected the neutral condition to correlate to a trust score of around 5 
(Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). 
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the main dining area.  The experiment was conducted during dinner hours from 5pm to 
7pm on six days between January 16, 2014 and January 23, 2014.  Additionally, a pilot 
study was conducted on three days between January 10, 2014 and January 12, 2014. 
 Recruiters approached participants in the dining hall and asked them if they would 
like to participate in a study (see script, Appendix B).  Students who showed interest in 
participating were escorted to the President’s room by the recruiters at regular intervals.   
Materials 
Emotion Induction Task 
 Based on several studies that manipulated emotions (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; 
Harle & Sanfey, 2007; Hewig, Hagemann, Seifert, Gollwitzer, Naumann & Bartussek, 
2005) I used film clips and a short writing exercise in order to induce happiness, anger or 
neutral emotions and maintain the cover story respectively. The film clips were each 
between two and three minutes long and were taken from commercially available feature 
length films. The film clip used to induce anger was a 163-second clip taken from the 
1980 movie My Bodyguard.  In the clip a shy, reserved boy named Rick goes to a park to 
meet some friends.  He is then harassed and attacked by a bully (Hewig et al., 2005).  The 
film clip designed to induce happiness was a 173-second clip taken from the 1989 film 
When Harry Met Sally.  In this clip Harry and Sally sit in a restaurant and discuss 
whether Harry would notice if a woman faked an orgasm (Hewig et al.).  Finally, the 
neutral film clip was 137-second clip taken from the 1986 movie Emperor.  In this clip, 
two characters, a young Chinese emperor and his English tutor have a discussion relating 
to the emperor’s studies (Hewig et al.).  These films have previously been found to 
induce the relevant emotions (Hewig et al.).  Because they are fairly old, I expected that 
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participants were unlikely to have recent, emotionally charged, memories from viewing 
one of these films.  Despite this precaution, some participants did have previous 
experiences with some of the movies the clips were taken from.  Notably, several 
participants had strong positive reactions to the happy condition film clip from ‘When 
Harry Met Sally’ due to previous experiences with the film. 
After viewing the film clips, participants completed a short writing exercise 
intended to maintain the cover story (deception) that the first experiment was measuring 
the effect of visual stimuli on motor coordination.  They wrote out the sentence “The 
woman went shopping,” using their non-dominant hand.  This part of the exercise 
generally took approximately one minute15.    
Procedures similar to the one employed here have been shown to effectively 
induce low to moderate levels of emotion (Hewig, Hagemann, Seifert, Gollwitzer, 
Naumann & Bartussek. 2005).   
Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
 The twenty-item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) served as an 
emotion induction manipulation check.  It employs a five-point scale to measure positive 
and negative affect and has been used with undergraduate and adult participant samples 
(Watson, Clark &Tellegen, 1988).  Participants are instructed to rate the extent to which 
they are experiencing each of twenty emotions at the present moment from not at all (1) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  In the pilot study, a different writing task was used that was supposed to strengthen the 
emotional manipulation.  This writing task asked participants to free-write for three minutes relating the 
clip they just saw to a personal experience in their lives.  However, after the pilot study was conducted, 
results on this task showed that participants often related the scene from the clip to a similar situation in 
their lives with a completely different emotional valence. Therefore, this task did not effectively serve its 
purpose and most likely reduced the emotional impact that the films had on many of the participants.  As a 
result, this section of the exercise was changed in the actual study; none of the data presented used this 
exercise in the emotional manipulation. 	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to extremely (5).  The instructions and scale can be viewed in Appendix A.  The 
measures of emotional valence collected through this schedule were designed to gauge 
the effectiveness of the emotion induction task.   
Prior to data analysis, the raw PANAS scores were combined into a positive affect 
scale and negative affect scale as described by Watson, Clark, and Tellegan (1988).  Both 
scales had extremely high reliability with the positive affect scale having a Crohnbach’s 
alpha of  (𝛼 = 0.88) and the negative affect scale having an alpha  (𝛼 = 0.91).   
Trust Game 
 In the ostensible second study, participants completed a measure of behavioral 
trust. The behavioral trust measure consisted of a simple game with the possibility of a 
large monetary payoff as a performance incentive.  This game was proposed by Berg, 
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) and has been replicated multiple times.  The participants 
received a page of instructions for the game and were told that they could ask the 
experimenter any questions they had about the game. 
The instructions for the game were as follows: 
In this experiment, you will play a game with another participant 
who will be responding to your decisions at a later date.  You have been 
matched with a single other participant.  You will not be told who the 
participant is either during or after the experiment and vice-versa.   
You will play the role of an investor and the other participant will 
play the role of an investment manager.  You will be given 10 points; 
these will be referred to as your endowment. At the end of the experiment 
each point will count as one raffle ticket towards the $200 lottery, so you 
want to end up with the greatest total number of points.  
 
The rules of the game are as follows:  
You can invest between 0 and 10 points of your endowment.  
Every point you invest will be tripled (that is if you invest 5 points, this 
will yield 15 points) and sent to the other participant. He or she will then 
decide if, and what portion, of this new amount of points to give back to 
you and what portion to keep for themselves.  
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The total points you will have at the end of this exchange will 
consist of whatever you decide to keep in addition to whatever the other 
participant returns to you. The other participant has been given their own 
10-point endowment, is aware of all of the same rules, and the points that 
he or she has at the end of the game will go towards raffle tickets for a 
separate $200 raffle. 
 
These instructions for the trust game involve deception since there was no actual 
second group of participants.  The reasoning behind not having a second group of 
participants, as was the case in the original Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) study, 
was that this research was solely interested in trust behavior, not reciprocity.  The trust 
game took a total of approximately two or three minutes and most participants didn’t ask 
questions and seemed to find the instructions clear during a post-experimental interview.   
Individual Difference and Demographic Measures 
 Participants provided demographic information (age, gender, college major) and 
completed a series of questions assessing individual differences.  These questions used a 
Likert Scale (1-7) to probe differences in risk-taking, chronic trust levels, attachment to 
the Bard community, and empathy (Appendix A).  The instructions for the individual 
difference questions asked participants to rate how much they agree with a given 
statement with one indicating ‘very little’ and seven indicating ‘strongly.’  Each 
individual difference measure was compiled using 5 different questions that were all 
intended to measure the same conceptual variable.  As a result, each of these items was 
ranked on a five to thirty five point scale (5 questions by 7 points on the scale for each 
question).  In all cases, the items were scored so that higher scores would result in higher 
affinity for the item; a higher score would indicate more trust or more risk.   
 For the measure of propensity for risk taking, the questions ranged from 
straightforward self-identification such as “I am a risk taker,” to more indirect, reverse-
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scored questions such as, “I don’t like to gamble.”  The questions for the risk instrument 
were fairly reliable (𝛼 = 0.68).  Empathy was measured using questions relating to a 
person’s experiences helping other people, “I have spent time volunteering and will 
continue to do so,” and whether they would perceive themselves as empathetic towards 
others, “I do not usually react emotionally to hardships experienced by others.”  This 
measure had much lower reliability, (𝛼 = 0.46).   
 The instrument used to measure attachment to the Bard community included 
general questions about participants’ feelings about their place in the community, “I feel 
that I fit in at Bard,” as well as questions about the social networks at the college such as, 
“I have found a group of close friends at Bard.”  Crohnbach’s alpha for these questions 
indicated an acceptable level of reliability (𝛼 = 0.58).  Finally, the self-report trust 
measure employed both general questions, “I generally trust people,” and more situation 
specific questions, “I feel that people betray me a lot,” and had fairly good reliability 
(𝛼 = 0.62).   
The full questionnaire was approximately four pages and was attached to the 
instruction sheet for the trust game.  The questionnaire can be viewed in Appendix A. 
Procedure 
 Due to time constraints, the experimenter generally ran three participants at a 
time.  Recruiters were encouraged to bring up to three participants for each run of the 
experiment, and this was often the case.  The setup of the experimental room was a large 
table with three laptop computers facing in different directions.  Each computer had 
headphones plugged into it and a pen beside it.  The experimenter had a separate desk 
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with the experimental forms and a computer  and a side table were set up to hold the 
candy bars. 
Once participants arrived at the experiment room they were asked to read and sign 
the first consent form.  They were told that they would be participating in two separate 
experiments and that together they would take approximately ten to fifteen minutes to 
complete.  At the start of the first experiment, participants read and signed the first 
consent form (see Appendix A).  Once they signed the consent form and were verbally 
consented by the experimenter (see experimenter script in Appendix B), the first part of 
the experiment was conducted.  In the first part, the participants completed the film-clip 
emotion induction task followed by the PANAS to test whether the emotion induction 
was effective. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to watch one of the three video clips. 
Consequently, participants being run at the same time would often be viewing different 
clips.  However, the computers were facing in different directions and the clips were 
approximately the same length so participants generally were not aware that different 
clips were being administered until the debriefing.  
 Following the completion of the emotion induction task and the PANAS, 
participants provided informed consent for the “second” study. The experimenter then 
distributed packets that included instructions for the trust game and the individual 
difference and demographic measures.  
 Once all participants in each session had completed the packet, the experimenter 
debriefed participants.  The verbal debriefing started out with the experimenter thanking 
participants for taking part in the experiment and asking them how they liked it.  
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 57	  
Additionally, the experimenter questioned participants on whether all the instructions 
were clear and whether they understood everything.  The experimenter then went on to 
explain the true research hypothesis and explain the two parts of the deception16.  The 
participants were then asked whether their data could still be used in the study now that 
they were aware of the deception.  Finally, the debriefing ended with the experimenter 
thanking subjects for their participation and offering them a candy bar and entry to the 
$200 lottery using the points they accumulated in the trust game as raffle tickets.  The full 
script for the verbal debriefing as well as the written debriefing that was offered to 
participants can be found in Appendix A.  Most participants were satisfied with the 
verbal debriefing and did not take the written debriefing.   
 Once the participants left, the experimenter stapled the experiment forms for each 
participant together.  This included the motor task/PANAS sheet and the trust game and 
survey.  These sheets were stored in a binder until they could be brought to a secure area 
at the end of the experiment sessions for that day.  
Power 
 Prior to the experiment, we conducted a proc power analysis using SAS.  We used 
a small effect size (Cohen’s d=0.30) because, based on previous studies, the standardized 
difference between the means for the effect of emotions on trust seemed to be fairly small 
(Dunn & Schweitzer, 1997). Assuming an effect size of Cohen's d=0.30 and 𝛼 = 0.05, 
the study would need 55 participants per group in order to have 80% power. Actual 
participant count ranged from 29 to 38 per group with a total participant pool of 102 
instead of 165, so this study was underpowered.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The first part of the deception is that the ‘two experiments’ that participants completed were actually two 
parts of a single experiment.  The second part of the deception is that, in the trust game, there is not actually 
another group of participants who would be reciprocating the trust offers. 
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 After the data were collected, they were transferred from the experimental forms 
to an excel spreadsheet.  The PANAS and individual difference scores were then 
compiled, as described in the materials section, and dummy variables were created for 
gender and intended major.  The experimenter coded for academic major of the 
participant by categorizing survey responses to the question about planned major into five 
distribution categories on the Bard College website.  These included arts, languages and 
literature, science math and computing (SMC), social studies, and undeclared. A dummy 
variable was then created for condition. 
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Chapter 7 
 Results 
Data 
 Table 1 shows basic summary statistics for all variables.  All variables have 
approximately 100 observations.  Gender is fairly evenly distributed and age and year (in 
college) seem to have a very low standard deviation with age ranging between 18 and 24 
and most participants being 19 years of age.  This indicates a very homogenous sample, 
which makes sense due to the data collection methods.  
 Risk, empathy, attachment to the Bard community, and self-reported trust, are all 
scored on a one to seven point scale.  This scale was derived by summing the five 
questions comprising each item and then dividing by five in order to attain a composite 
mean on the original scale.  The means, variance, and range for these variables all seem 
fairly similar.  Film manipulation susceptibility was also scored on a one to seven point 
scale, so the standard deviation of 1.65 seems very high in comparison to the other survey 
questions.   
 The mean for the positive affect scale was significantly higher than the negative 
affect scale, which suggests that participants had lower reported levels of negative affect 
following all film manipulations.  Additionally, negative affect scores had a much lower 
variance than positive affect scores, although affect did not vary by condition in either 
case.  This difference in means and variance might be attributable to issues with self-
report and participants being less likely to report negative affect in an experimental 
setting.  This pattern of results seems to be consistent with previous studies that 
employed the PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). 
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 60	  
The dependent variable, comprised of the scores from the trust game, had a mean 
of 5.9, which is slightly higher than the mean of 5.16 in the original experiment (Berg, 
Dickhaut & McCabe, 1995).  Similar to the original experiment, the range of actual offers 
covered the full spectrum of possible offers, ranging from 0 to 10 (Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe, 1995). 
 Table 2 shows the breakdown of the condition variable.  The anger condition had 
the most participants with 38, neutral had 35 participants, and happy had 29.  This uneven 
distribution of participants across experimental groups was due to the random assignment 
of condition using a random number generator.   
Manipulation check 
 To test whether the video manipulation was successful in inducing emotions, I 
compared positive and negative affect (as measured by the PANAS) across the three 
conditions. A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on positive affect (Table 3) 
revealed a significant effect of condition, F(2, 98)=3.60, p=0.03. According to a t-test, 
participants in the neutral (M=2.72, SD=0.65) and happy (M=2.71, SD=0.69) conditions 
did not differ from one other, although both groups expressed more positive affect than 
participants in the angry (M=2.35, SD=0.66) condition.  The results are in the expected 
direction with participants experiencing greater positive affect in the happy than the 
angry condition; this can be seen in the scatter plot in Figure 1. 
 The second manipulation check is an ANOVA of negative affect by condition 
(Table 4).  This manipulation check was significant at the p=0.10 level, F(2, 98)=2.56, 
p=0.08.  Once again, means for the neutral (M=1.50, SD=0.51) and happy (M=1.52, 
SD=0.48) conditions were very similar. The results of this test were also in the expected 
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direction with participants experiencing less negative affect in the happy condition as 
compared to the anger condition (M=1.75, SD=0.56); this can be seen in the scatter plot 
in Figure 2.   
A third ANOVA was conducted for susceptibility to film manipulation by 
condition (Table 5).  Contrary to predictions, the results were in fact significant at the 
p=0.10 level, F(2,98)=2.66, p=0.07.  I predicted that the means in this ANOVA should be 
equal across all conditions because, due to random assignment, there should not be any 
significant difference in how emotionally susceptible individuals are to films.  However, 
the survey was administered at the end of the experiment (after the film manipulation) 
and asked questions such as ‘Do you usually cry when you watch sad movies?’  As a 
result, this measure might not indicate how naturally emotionally susceptible participants 
are to films, but instead how susceptible they feel they are as a result of watching the 
experimental film manipulations.  The pattern of means indicates that participants in the 
anger condition (M=4.50, SD=1.68) felt more susceptible to the film manipulation than 
participants in the neutral (M=3.90, SD=1.60) and happy (M=3.61, SD=1.59) conditions 
(Figure 3).  This makes sense considering that anger is a more salient emotion than the 
happiness or neutral conditions.  The pattern of means in the positive and negative affect 
ANOVA’s also reflects this; the means for the neutral and happy conditions were almost 
the same in both cases.  
Essentially, the manipulation check indicated that the results were in the expected 
direction but there was no significant difference between the happy and neutral 
conditions.  These results suggest that the happiness manipulation was not effective 
and/or the neutral manipulation induced positive affect.  These findings could be 
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attributed to two things.  The first is that participants might have come into the 
experiment with preexisting positive affect.  This is feasible because participants were 
recruited during their dinner hour and were often recruited in groups of three with their 
friends.  Additionally, the recruiting process was opportunistic in that those individuals 
who wanted to participate in the study were self-selected.  This might have skewed the 
sample towards individuals who had positive affect and were willing to try new things 
such as participation in an experiment.  The second explanation for this effect is that the 
neutral condition might have induced happiness.  On several trials I noted that some 
participants in the neutral condition laughed.  When asked about it in the debriefing they 
often cited one of the characters’ accents as the reason for why they found it funny.  
Additionally, the notion that participants in the neutral condition experienced some 
positive affect would explain why trust scores were on the high end (M=5.9) when 
compared with the original Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) experiment (M=5.16), 
despite the fact that the anger condition had more participants. 
In conclusion, the emotion manipulation seemed to be effective in the expected 
direction, the anger condition induced negative affect and the happiness condition 
induced positive affect.  However, the neutral condition was not significantly different 
from the happy condition.  This is most likely due to participants in the neutral condition 
displaying positive affect as well as the happy condition not being extremely effective.   
Effects of emotion manipulation on trust behavior 
 The main goal of this thesis was to test whether incidental emotions have an 
impact on trust decisions.  To this end, I conducted a one-way ANOVA on trust behavior 
by condition and a simple regression (Table 6, Table 7).  The ANOVA results were not 
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statistically significant (F(2,98)=1.49, p=.23) and the regression was marginally 
significant at the p=.10 level (𝛽 = 0.58, t(101)=1.66, p=.10).  However, the results were 
in the expected direction with greater levels of trust behavior in the happy (M=6.41, 
SD=2.90) than the anger (M=5.27, SD=2.70) conditions.  Similar to the manipulation 
checks, the means for the neutral (M=6.14, SD=2.98) and happy (M=6.41, SD=2.90) 
conditions were extremely close.  This indicates that there might be a significant 
difference in trust between the anger and neutral as well as the anger and happy 
conditions but no significant difference between the happy and neutral conditions.   
 In order to explore the interrelationships among the variables, I ran a series of 
correlations between each independent variable and the dependent variable (trust 
behavior) both overall and by condition (Table 8).  This correlation table yielded 
interesting findings.  The first point of note is that risk seems to be positively and 
significantly correlated with trust both overall (R= 0.27) and in the anger (R=0.29) and 
neutral (R=0.50) conditions.  This indicates that as propensity for risk increases, so does 
the propensity to trust; this relationship can clearly be seen in the scatter plot in Figure 4.  
The fact that this effect is only significant in the anger and neutral conditions might be 
due to the low sample size in the happy condition (n=29) or the issues with the 
effectiveness of the manipulation discussed earlier.  However, these results, while 
exploratory, are very interesting, as they suggest that risk-aversion explains much of the 
variance for purported trust behavior in the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) trust 
game, which has been a staple of trust studies in behavioral game theory. 
The second statistically significant result is the negative correlation between 
empathy and trust in the anger condition (R=-0.36), which can be viewed in Figure 5.  
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This indicates that participants with higher levels of empathy towards others were less 
trusting in the anger condition.  This might be because more naturally empathetic 
participants might have been more affected by the anger manipulation.  The film clip 
used to induce anger consisted of a young man being harassed and assaulted by a bully.  
More empathetic participants might have felt more empathy for the young man in the 
film clip and, as a result, the anger manipulation might have had a greater impact on them 
and thus induced them to trust less.   
Finally, attachment to the Bard college community was significantly and 
positively correlated to trust both overall and in the happy condition.  This suggests that 
as attachment and feelings of belonging at Bard increase, so does trust behavior.  This 
supports the hypothesis and the reasoning behind including this variable.  I hypothesized 
that greater feelings of attachment to Bard would cause participants to view the 
anonymous (Bard student) trustee in the game as more trustworthy.  This would in turn 
affect their behavior and cause them to invest more.    
 Overall, these findings fit in with my hypothesis and with data from the 
manipulation check showing low differences between the neutral and happy conditions.  
The next section contains the main data analysis, consisting of a multiple regression 
model for all variables of interest.  This model was used in order to investigate the effect 
of the demographic and individual difference variables (risk, empathy, attachment to 
Bard, major, self-reported trust) on trust.  Additionally, the model was used to clarify the 
effect of emotions on trust behavior by taking these variables out of the error term and 
controlling for them within the model. 
Multivariate Regression Model 
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 Initial iterations of the multiple regression model indicated that the variables age, 
year (in college), and gender should be taken out of the model.  Age and year posed 
obvious problems of multicollinearity, and had extremely low variance with 84% of 
participants between the ages of 18 and 20.  Gender had a highly insignificant p-value 
and significantly reduced the adjusted 𝑅! so it was omitted as well.  The PANAS scores 
and the film susceptibility scores were also omitted because they also reduced the fit of 
the model.  
 As a result, the multivariate regression model regressed risk, empathy, attachment 
to Bard, self-reported trust, and dummies for major and condition onto the behavioral 
trust scores: 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡1 = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽!𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑦 + 𝛽!𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡2 + 𝑖𝑥.𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 +𝑖𝑥. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + ℯ   
Due to the ordinal nature of both the dependent and independent variables, the 
data were not normally distributed.  A Jarque-Bera test for normality backs up this 
assumption, indicating issues with skew and kurtosis (Table 13)17. As a result, I 
employed an ordered probit model (Table 9) and an ordered logit (Table 10) model to 
account for the non-continuous dependent variable.  These models essentially provided a 
better fit for the data by utilizing probability and logarithmic-based functional forms in 
the regression model. 
A comparison of the ordered probit, ordered logit, and ordinary least squares 
models (Table 11) shows that the logarithmic functional form of the ordered logit best fits 
the data overall (𝜒! = 27.80,𝑃𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑅! = 0.06).  As a result, this model will be used 
as the main multivariate model (Table 10).  The equation below represents the ordered 	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  The issues with the normality of the distribution will be discussed in more detail later on.	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logit model with y* being the unobserved conceptual variable ‘trust behavior’ and y 
being the observed variable of the trust score from the trust game. 
 
𝑦 =
0  𝑖𝑓  𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,1  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,2  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,3  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!4  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,5  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,6  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,7  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,8  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!,9  𝑖𝑓    𝜇! < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!",10  𝑖𝑓    𝜇!" < 𝑦∗ ≤ 𝜇!!,
                 
 
ln 𝑃(𝑦 = 1)1− 𝑃(𝑦 = 1)= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡2+ 𝑖𝑥.𝑚𝑎𝑗𝑜𝑟 + 𝑖𝑥. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + ℯ     
 
In the ordered logistic regression, risk (z(101)=3.40, p=0.001), empathy (z(101)=-
2.03, p=0.04), Bard attachment (z(101)=2.86, p=0.004), and the dummy variables for the 
neutral (z(101)=2.40, p=0.02) and happy (z(101)=2.11, p=0.035) conditions18 were all 
statistically significant.  Self reported trust scores and dummies for major were not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The anger condition was used as the reference category because results from the manipulation check and 
the simple effects for emotions on trust indicated that there was no significant difference between the happy 
and neutral conditions. 
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statistically significant.  In order to compare coefficients for the variables, marginal 
effects for the ordered logit model were calculated (Table 12).19 
According to this model, controlling for all other variables, each unit increase in 
risk increases the probability of selecting the highest level of trust (giving 10 points to the 
trustee) by 8.5%20.  Similarly, each unit of increase in attachment to Bard increases the 
probability of selecting the highest trust level by 8.1%.  Holding all other variables 
constant, each unit increase in empathy decreases the probability of entrusting the full 
endowment by approximately 5.2%.  This pattern of results is similar to what was seen in 
the correlation tables.  The negative relationship between empathy and trust stems from a 
strong negative relationship within the anger condition, which was discussed previously.  
The positive effect of risk on trust behavior and empathy on trust behavior, controlling 
for all other variables in the model, is in line with my secondary hypotheses that 
propensity to take risks increases willingness to trust and that attachment to the Bard 
community would increase willingness to trust.   
The marginal effects for the dummy variables for condition indicated that, 
controlling for all other variables in the model, a change in condition from the anger 
condition to the neutral or happy condition increases the probability of selecting the 
highest level of trust by 15% and 13% respectively.  The anger condition was selected as 
the reference category due to the lack of a significant difference between the means of the 
neutral and happy conditions.  This is reflected in these results, which are in the predicted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  For the marginal effects I selected 10 as the outcome category for the dependent variable because it is 
the highest level of the trust score (the greatest amount of ‘trust’ a participant could give).  Additionally, it 
was chosen because measuring the effect of an increase in 𝑥!,𝑥!… 𝑥! on an increase in trust makes intuitive 
sense considering the rest of the data analyses and the nature of the research hypothesis. Also, the increase 
in the independent variable was calculated with respect to the mean values reported in Table 12. 	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direction.  In other words, moving from an emotional experience of anger to a neutral or 
happy emotional experience, on average, significantly increases trust behavior.  These 
results allow us to reject the null hypothesis,  
 𝐻!:  𝜇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 = 𝜇𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 = 𝜇ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦 
Furthermore they provide support for research hypotheses 1.1 and 1.3 that 
emotions with negative valence (anger) decrease trust behavior and emotions with 
positive valence (happiness) increase trust behavior. 𝐻!.!:  𝜇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 < 𝜇𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝐻!.!:  𝜇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟 < 𝜇ℎ𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑦     
Post-testing 
 Post-testing for the validity of the model was conducted using the OLS regression 
model.  Low variable inflation factor indicated that none of the variables have significant 
multicollinearity (Table 13).  Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisenberg and White’s tests for 
heteroskedasticity (Table 14, Table 15) indicated the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
data.  A scatter plot of the residuals by the fitted values (Figure 7) and a histogram for the 
distribution of the residuals (Figure 8) also indicated the presence of skew and 
heteroskedasticity. 
 This lack of normality in the distribution could be the result of one or both of two 
separate processes.  The first is that the conceptual variables are not normally distributed.  
The second is that both the dependent and independent variables are ordinal and, by 
definition, limited.  As a result, linear regression models would not be adept at fitting the 
functional form for these data.  Since there is no reason to believe that the underlying 
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 69	  
conceptual variables are non-normal, I addressed the possible mechanical issues of using 
ordinal variables by using the ordered logistic model described above.  
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Chapter 8 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Implications of the study 
This study set out to explore the influence of emotions on trust behavior.  This is a 
topic that has recently received growing attention from social scientists that are interested 
in economic decision-making.  It’s significance lies in the development of an 
understanding of trust on both a micro and macro level and the incorporation of this 
understanding into current analyses of trust behavior in economics, social psychology, 
and behavioral game theory.  Findings relating to emotions and trust could be applied to 
industrial relations, marketing and sales, and negotiation settings.  
On a microeconomic level, the influence of incidental emotions on trust behavior 
has significant implications for the study of organizations.  If, as was argued in the 
second chapter, trust acts as an economic lubricant and reduces transaction costs, then 
increasing trust could result in better performance on the part of managers and employees 
in the workplace.  Reducing the presence of negative emotions in the workplace 
environment and promoting trust between employees and managers could yield higher 
worker productivity and efficiency.  Additionally, programs could be instituted to help 
make executives and key decision-makers aware of how emotions influence their 
behavior, and how to utilize the creation of positive affect to increase trust levels.   
Similarly, the link between emotions and trust behavior could be applied to 
marketing and sales techniques in which positive affect induction techniques could be 
used to increase trust on the part of buyers towards sellers.  As was seen in the Resnick et 
al., (2006) study reviewed in chapter two, consumers even seem to be willing to pay a 
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price premium for a trustworthy buyer, especially in a market with information 
asymmetries.   
The current study, and future research on this topic, could also be applied to high-
stakes negotiation settings.  Informing decision-makers of the interaction between trust 
and other variables such as incidental emotions, risk tendencies, empathy tendencies, and 
attachment to a common community, could induce better decision-making and more 
favorable outcomes in negotiation settings.  These factors would apply to a wide variety 
of settings from labor contract negotiation to inter-organizational relations and political 
negotiations. 
The implementation of micro-level changes to increase trust, if applied across 
different industries and situations, could result in a perceptible impact on broader 
macroeconomic function.  This would be especially true in high-stakes environments 
such as finance where decision-makers control large quantities of high-risk financial 
assets.   
Overview of key findings 
In contrast to previous work (Dunn & Schweizer, 2005), the current study 
combined an emotion induction task with a behavioral game designed to measure trust 
decisions.  Using anger, happiness, and neutral emotion induction my primary hypothesis 
was that anger would decrease trust behavior and happiness would increase trust 
behavior, relative to the neutral condition.   
Confirming my hypothesis, one of the key findings of this project is that emotions 
do seem to impact trust decisions in the expected direction.  Anger is associated with less 
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trusting behavior and neutral or happy emotions are associated with more trusting 
behavior.   
In addition to the primary hypotheses, the results also indicated the relevance of 
several control variables.  These variables include risk tendencies, empathy, and 
attachment to the same community as the trustee.  These variables were included in my 
three secondary hypotheses.  These stated that I expected (1) risk would be positively 
correlated with trust (i.e. higher propensity for risk taking would be associated with more 
trusting behavior), (2) empathy would be positively correlated with trust (i.e. higher 
levels of empathy would be associated with more trusting behavior), and (3) attachment 
to the Bard community would be positively correlated with trust (i.e. greater feelings of 
attachment or belonging within the Bard community would be associated with more 
trusting behavior). 
Of these secondary hypotheses, numbers one and three showed significant results 
in the expected direction and number two showed significant results in the opposite 
direction (empathy yielded a negative coefficient when regressed on trust in the main 
ordered logit model).  The reasoning behind the unexpected results for the relationship 
between empathy and trust were discussed in the results section and can most likely be 
attributed to an experimental artifact relating to the emotion manipulation in which more 
empathetic participants were more strongly affected by the anger condition film clip.  
The results from the third hypothesis indicate that participants who had a higher 
level of attachment to the community seemed to trust more.  In the context of the 
experiment, the individual they were trusting was an anonymous student who, it was 
implied, was also a member of the Bard community.  This suggests that participants’ 
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level of attachment to the community reflects the level of shared group identity the 
participants felt with the trustee.  The results reported by Lount (2010), covered in the 
fifth chapter, indicated that heuristics applied to outgroups do impact the effect of 
emotion on trust.  This relationship between group membership, emotions, and trust 
decisions, which seems to be supported by my data, has important implications for 
decision-making in the real world.  Future studies could investigate how trust operates 
between members of different racial and ethnic groups and how emotions would play into 
that.  With prejudice and stereotyping often creating environments with high emotionally 
valence, the interaction of emotions, trust, and group membership could be investigated 
in order to reduce ethnic and racial bias in crucial ways. 
The first hypothesis, regarding risk, was an interesting finding especially in the 
context of the current literature on emotions and trust.  Table 16 shows a comparison of 
two versions of the main multivariate logit model, one including the risk variable and one 
excluding it.  The main difference between these models is that when risk is excluded 
from the model, the dummy variables for the emotion condition drop in significance.  
This indicates that part of the effect of emotions on trust relates to risk; the exclusion of 
the risk measure from the model leads to an underestimation of the effect of emotions on 
trust.  Essentially, by treating trust and risk as two separate, non-synonymous, conceptual 
variables we control for risk and find that taking risk tendencies into consideration 
(taking the variable out of the error term) increases the effects of emotion on trust 
behavior.  How can we interpret these findings in relation to the current literature?  To 
answer this question, I will first discuss the link between risk and trust and then assess 
recent literature on the link between emotions and risk. 
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 Two main conceptual approaches to the relationship between risk and trust exist 
in the current literature.  The first approach views risk as an integral component of trust 
as well as a separate conceptual variable.  According to Rosseau, Sitkin, Burt, and 
Camerer (1998), “Risk is one condition considered essential in psychological, 
sociological, and economic conceptualizations of trust,” (p. 395). This statement suggests 
that risk is an integral part of trust behavior and that, although they are separate concepts, 
there is a part of risk that overlaps with trust.  Looking back at the literature review 
conducted in chapter two, it seems that the majority of the empirical literature on trust 
tends to assume that trust has inherent risk components (e.g Resnick et al., 2006; 
Ortmann, Fitzgerald & Boeing, 2000).  In other words, if we think of trust and risk as two 
separate conceptual variables with an overlap between them, the majority of current 
empirical literature measures the entirety of trust, including, and ignoring the role of, the 
risk component.  In some cases empirical and theoretical works have separated out risk 
and trust and treated them as two different conceptual variables. However, risk tendencies 
has rarely been controlled for in these studies (Kim, Ferrin & Rao, 2008; Chiles & 
McMackin, 1996).  My analysis rectifies these shortcomings by controlling for risk.  
Essentially, my model removes the part of trust that is risk-based and evaluates the non-
risky components of trust.  In my analysis, I found that the effect of emotions on the part 
of trust behavior that is not risk based is greater than the effect of emotions on trust 
including its risk components.  This leads us to the question of how risk has been 
evaluated in the effect of emotions on trust in the existing literature. 
While research on the link between risk and trust only began in the 1990’s (Chiles 
& McMackin, 1996), research on the link between emotions and risk perceptions dates 
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back to the 1970’s (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Sjoberg, 
2007).  Empirical approaches to the relationship between emotions and risk follow from 
two major frameworks established by Johnson and Tversky (1983) and Isen and Patrick 
(1983) (in Fessler, Pillsworth & Flamson, 2003).  The first framework, by Johnson and 
Tversky (1983) stems from a study on risk perceptions regarding catastrophes and 
accidents reviewed in chapter four.  The results of this study suggest that emotions with 
negative (positive) valence increase the perceived probability of the occurrence of 
negative (positive) events (Johnson & Tverksy, 1983).  In other words, negative affect 
would induce less risky behavior due to a higher perceived probability of negative 
outcomes (Leith & Baumeister, 1996; Direnfeld & Roberts, 2006).   
The mood maintenance hypothesis proposed by Isen and Patrick (1983) seems to 
contradict these results by suggesting that individuals experiencing positive affect will 
attempt to maintain their current affective state and, as a result, will make more 
conservative, less risky, decisions (Isen & Patrick, 1983).   Alternately, individuals 
experiencing negative affect will have an increased propensity for risk because they will 
attempt to attain positive affect through possible payoffs from risky decisions (Nygren, 
Isen, Taylor & Dublin, 1996). 
These seemingly contradictory results have been mediated by recent studies 
investigating the role of situational and context based influences, individual differences 
such as gender, and emotion components such as appraisal tendencies in the link between 
emotions and risk (Fessler, Pillsworth & Flamson, 2003; Foo, 2009).  For example, one 
study induced emotions with high certainty and control appraisals (happiness and anger) 
and low certainty and control appraisals (hope and fear) (Foo, 2009).  Participants then 
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completed a task designed to measure perceived risk in business ventures (Foo, 2009).  
Results indicated that participants experiencing emotions with high certainty and control 
appraisals were less risk sensitive and thus had a higher propensity for risk-taking (Foo, 
2009).  Participants experiencing emotions with low certainty and control appraisals were 
more risk averse and estimated higher probabilities of risk for a given decision (Foo, 
2009).  These results suggest that, similarly to trust (Myers & Tingley, 2010), certainty 
and control appraisals play a role in the relationship between emotions and risk.   
Additionally, the frameworks for emotions and decision-making reviewed in the 
theoretical framework for the current research in chapter four can be applied to the link 
between emotions and risk. For example, the affect infusion model has been used to 
evaluate the contexts in which emotions would impact risk assessments and behavior 
(Foo, 2009).  The affect as information hypothesis has also been used to support Johnson 
and Tversky’s (1983) model for emotions and risk.  It does so by asserting that negative 
emotions would induce bottom-up processing (discussed in chapter four) and this would 
lead to risk aversion because of a focus on possible negative consequences (Martin & 
Stoner, 1996).  
No single framework has been established for analyzing the relationship between 
emotions and risk (Fessler, Pillsworth & Flamson, 2003).  However, it is clear that the 
same factors that impact the relationship between emotions and trust, and the same 
frameworks and theories used to analyze the relationship between emotions and trust, 
have also be applied to the link between emotions and risk.  Essentially, this indicates 
that future research could develop a single theoretical framework for the effect of 
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emotions on both risk and trust, and utilize a new experimental design treating risk and 
trust as two separate conceptual variables. 
In the current research risk was integrated into the experimental design through 
the use of self-report measures.  This utilization of risk as a control variable sets the 
current study apart from the existing literature in that it provides some of the first 
empirical evidence for the existence of a relationship between emotions, risk, and trust. 
While this was one of the key strengths of the study, the next section will give a brief 
overview of the limitations of the current research.   
Limitations of the study 
 The key limitation of this study is that it was underpowered.  As discussed in 
chapter six, the generally accepted level of power for experiments in psychology is 
around 80%.  In this study, the preliminary power analysis indicated that, assuming a 
small effect size, the experiment would need 55 participants per condition in order to 
attain 80% power.  This would indicate a total participant pool of 165 participants across 
the 3 conditions.  The actual sample size was 102 and the participant number in each 
condition ranged from 29 to 38.  This low power indicates that there would be a low 
likelihood of attaining significant results without increasing the sample size, implying a 
higher probability of making a type II error.  The actual sample size was constrained by 
time and by the small size of the Bard student population.  Very likely, the fact that the 
results were significant despite the small sample size suggests that we might be 
underestimating the effect of incidental emotions on trust behavior and that a larger 
sample could yield more significant results.  
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 The second issue with the current research concerns the happy/neutral condition 
manipulations.  The means for these two conditions were nearly identical, which could 
indicate that the happy condition was ineffective or that the neutral condition induced 
positive affect.  This conclusion is supported by Table 17, which compares three ordered 
logit models in which the only difference is that the reference dummy for the condition 
variable is changed.  When the happy and neutral conditions are included with anger as 
the reference category (this is the setup in the main logit model), both dummies are 
significant at the p=.05 level.  However, when the anger and happy conditions are 
included in the model, results for the happy condition are not significant because the 
neutral condition is being used as the reference category.  The same pattern of results is 
present when anger and neutral dummies are included in the model with the happy 
condition as the reference category (Table 17).   
The possibilities for why this might have occurred are discussed in the first 
section of chapter seven.  In either case, the happy and/or neutral emotion manipulations 
seem to be less effective than the anger condition.  This implies that we can’t establish 
the extent to which the neutral condition clearly represents a non-emotional baseline.  
Additionally it is impossible, based on these data, to discern whether there is a significant 
difference in trust between happy and neutral emotion individuals.  Notwithstanding this 
caveat, the anger condition was robust and the way I dealt with this shortcoming was to 
focus on anger as the key emotional condition.  Future studies could try to employ 
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different film clips in the happy and neutral conditions and recruit participants from 
neutral settings21.  
 A third limitation of the current research is the limited number of emotion 
manipulation conditions.  Due to the constraints on sample size discussed previously, I 
chose anger, neutral, and happy as the three conditions that seemed most likely to impact 
trust decisions based on the emotion theory presented in chapters three and four.  
However, with a larger sample size, it would have been interesting to include more 
emotion groups.   
In a recent working paper, Myers and Tingley (2011) do in fact include more 
emotion conditions in a very similar experimental setup.  These researchers test Dunn and 
Schweitzer’s (2005) findings that emotions with strong other-person control appraisals 
are more likely to influence trust behavior.  They used the autobiographical emotion 
memory task22 to induce anger, anxiety, guilt, happiness and self assurance before 
instructing participants to play the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) trust game.  They 
found that negative emotions decrease trust, but only if the emotions have low certainty 
appraisals (Myers & Tingley, 2011).  Thus, the inclusion of more emotion conditions 
allowed these researchers to conduct a more in-depth investigation of the emotion theory 
behind emotional impacts on trust decisions. 
Directions for future research 
The current study makes a significant contribution to the current behavioral game 
theory literature on trust by highlighting the relationship between emotions, risk, and trust 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The results section discusses that participants might have come in with preexisting positive affect 
because they were recruited at groups (usually with their friends) during their dinner hour at Kline 
Commons.   22	  This task induces emotion by asking participants to write about a time in their life when they felt a 
certain emotion. 
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behavior.  While previous studies have theorized that risk is a key component of trust 
decisions, this study provides empirical evidence supporting this claim.  Furthermore, this 
study provides an important insight into the Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) trust 
game, a cornerstone of behavioral game theory trust games, by suggesting that much of 
the variability in trust levels may be attributable to individual differences in risk 
preference.   
Future research on emotions and trust decisions could build on this thesis by (1) 
introducing more emotion conditions (similarly to Myers & Tingley, 2011) and (2) 
investigating the relationship between risk, trust, and emotions.  While the former 
approach would be fairly straightforward in that it could employ the same experimental 
design used here, the second approach would need a new experimental design in order to 
separate out the effects of risk and trust.  Additionally, the effects of empathy and 
attachment to a community in relation to trust and emotions could also be effectively 
investigated using different experimental designs. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations M SD Minimum Maximum 
Condition 102 1.91 0.81 1 3 
Trust Behavior 101 5.90 2.87 0 10 
Positive Affect 101 2.58 0.68 1 4.2 
Negative Affect 101 1.60 0.53 1 3.1 
Age 101 19.37 1.38 18 24 
Gender 100 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Year In College 101 1.77 1.09 1 5 
Major In College 101 2.17 1.39 0 4 
Risk 101 3.76 1.09 1.6 6.4 
Empathy 101 4.51 1.00 2.6 6.4 
Attachment to Bard 101 4.96 1.00 2.2 6.8 
Trust Self Report 101 4.12 1.02 1.6 6.4 
Susceptibility to Film Manipulation 101 4.04 1.65 1 7 
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Table 2: Summary of Condition Variable 
Condition N Percent Cumulative Percent 
Anger 38 37.25 37.25 
Neutral 35 34.31 71.57 
Happy 29 28.43 100.00 
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Table 3: Positive Affect by Condition ANOVA 
Summary of Variable 
Condition M SD N   
 Anger 2.35 0.66  37  
  Neutral 2.72 0.65  35  
  Happy 2.71 0.69  29  
  Total 2.58 0.68  101  
  Analysis of Variance 
Source SS df MS F P 
Between groups 3.18 2 1.59 3.60 0.031 
Within groups 43.31 98 0.44 
  Total 46.49 100 0.46     
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Table 4: Negative Affect by Condition ANOVA 
Summary of Variable 
Condition M SD N   
 Anger 1.75 0.56  37  
  Neutral 1.50 0.51  35  
  Happy 1.52 0.48  29  
  Total 1.60 0.53  101  
  Analysis of Variance 
Source SS df MS F P 
Between groups 1.38 2 0.69 2.56 0.0827 
Within groups 26.44 98 0.27 
  Total 27.82 100 0.28     
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Table 5: Susceptibility to Film Manipulation by Condition ANOVA 
Summary of Variable 
Condition M SD N   
 Anger 4.50 1.68 37 
  Neutral 3.90 1.60 35 
  Happy 3.61 1.59 29 
  Total 4.04 1.65 101 
  Analysis of Variance 
Source SS df MS F P 
Between groups 14.10 2 7.05 2.66 0.075 
Within groups 259.44 98 2.65 
  Total 273.53 100 2.74     
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Table 6: Trust Behavior by Condition ANOVA 
Summary of Variable 
Condition M SD N   
 Anger 5.27 2.70 37 
  Neutral 6.14 2.98 35 
  Happy 6.41 2.90 29 
  Total 5.90 2.87 101 
  Analysis of Variance 
Source SS df MS F P 
Between groups 24.39 2 12.20 1.49 0.230 
Within groups 800.62 98 8.17 
  Total 825.01 100 8.25 
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Table 7: Trust Behavior by Condition Uncontrolled 
Regression 
 Independent Variable 𝛽,  P, SE 
 Condition 0.585 
 
 
(0.352) 
 Constant 4.778*** 
   (0.733) 
 Observations = 101   
 R^2 = 0.027   
 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Correlation of Variables with Trust Behavior 
Variable Overall Anger Neutral Happy 
Age 0.03 0.2 -0.04 -0.06 
Major -0.1 -0.25 -0.01 -0.03 
Risk 0.27*** 0.29* 0.5*** 0.11 
Empathy -0.14 -0.36** 0.03 -0.11 
Attachment to Bard 0.25** 0.27 0.14 0.43** 
Self-Reported Trust 0.037 0.11 -0.13 0.16 
Film Susceptibility -0.15 -0.17 -0.2 0.06 
Positive Affect 0.08 0.16 -0.02 -0.03 
Negative Affect -0.06 0.17 -0.04 -0.25 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 90	  
 
Table 9: Multivariate Ordered Probit Model (Dependent Variable: Trust 
Behavior) 
Independent Variables β, SE 
Risk 0.331*** 
 
(0.104) 
Empathy -0.213* 
 
(0.11) 
Attachment to Bard 0.326*** 
 
(0.118) 
Trust Self-Report -0.0185 
 
(0.113) 
Major Undeclared -0.137 
 
(0.378) 
Major Art 0.185 
 
(0.296) 
Major Languages -0.0435 
 
(0.383) 
Major SMC -0.0755 
 
(0.307) 
Condition Neutral 0.638** 
 
(0.262) 
Condition Happy 0.487* 
  (0.266) 
Observations = 101   
χ^2  = 25.15 
 P > χ^2  = 0.005 
 Log likelihood = -210.774 
Pseudo R^2 = 0.056   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Multivariate Ordered Logit Model (Dependent Variable: Trust 
Behavior) 
Independent Variables β, SE 
Risk 0.626*** 
 
(0.184) 
Empathy -0.379** 
 
(0.187) 
Attachment to Bard 0.594*** 
 
(0.208) 
Trust Self-Report -0.0749 
 
(0.202) 
Major Undeclared -0.115 
 
(0.648) 
Major Art 0.0895 
 
(0.485) 
Major Languages 0.0002 
 
(0.623) 
Major SMC -0.254 
 
(0.532) 
Condition Neutral 1.070** 
 
(0.447) 
Condition Happy 0.973** 
  (0.461) 
Observations = 101   
χ^2  = 27.80 
 P > χ^2  = 0.002 
 Log likelihood = -209.448  
Pseudo R^2 = 0.062   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11: Comparison Table for OLS, Ordered Probit, and Ordered Logit Multivariate Models 
(Dependent Variable: Trust Behavior) 
  OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit 
Independent 
Variables β, SE β, SE β, SE 
Risk 0.776*** 0.331*** 0.626*** 
 
(0.258) (0.104) (0.184) 
Empathy -0.487* -0.213* -0.379** 
 
(0.279) (0.11) (0.187) 
Attachment to Bard 0.768** 0.326*** 0.594*** 
 
(0.297) (0.118) (0.208) 
Trust Self-Report -0.0195 -0.0185 -0.0749 
 
(0.292) (0.113) (0.202) 
Major Undeclared -0.253 -0.137 -0.115 
 
(0.957) (0.378) (0.648) 
Major Art 0.491 0.185 0.0895 
 
(0.768) (0.296) (0.485) 
Major Languages -0.0797 -0.0435 0.000204 
 
(0.981) (0.383) (0.623) 
Major SMC -0.22 -0.0755 -0.254 
 
(0.794) (0.307) (0.532) 
Condition Neutral 1.523** 0.638** 1.070** 
 
(0.669) (0.262) (0.447) 
Condition Happy 1.14 0.487* 0.973** 
  (0.686) (0.266) (0.461) 
  Observations = 101 Observations = 101 Observations = 101 
 
F(10,90)  = 2.46 χ^2  = 25.15 χ^2  = 27.80 
 
P > F  = 0.012 P > χ^2  = 0.005 P > χ^2  = 0.002 
 
R^2=0.215 
Log likelihood =  
-210.774  
Log likelihood =  
-209.448  
  
Adjusted R^2 = 
0.128 Pseudo R^2 = 0.056 Pseudo R^2 = 0.062 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Marginal Effects for Ordered Logistic Regression 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Risk 0.085 0.028 3.06 0.002 0.031 0.139 
Empathy -0.052 0.026 -1.95 0.051 -0.103 0.000 
Attachment to Bard 0.081 0.030 2.69 0.007 0.022 0.140 
Trust Self Report -0.010 0.027 -0.37 0.710 -0.064 0.044 
Major Undeclared -0.016 0.088 -0.18 0.859 -0.188 0.157 
Major Art 0.012 0.066 0.18 0.854 -0.117 0.142 
Major Languages 0.000 0.085 0.00 1.000 -0.166 0.166 
Major SMC -0.035 0.072 -0.48 0.632 -0.176 0.107 
Condition Neutral 0.145 0.064 2.26 0.024 0.019 0.271 
Condition Happy 0.132 0.065 2.03 0.043 0.004 0.260 
Marginal Effects Evaluated in Relation to Means: 
  Risk 3.756436   
    Empathy 4.514851 
     Attachment to Bard 4.961386 
     Trust Self Report 4.118812 
     Major Undeclared 0.1287129 
     Major Art 0.2772277 
     Major Languages 0.1188119 
     Major SMC 0.2475248 
     Condition Neutral 0.3465347 
     Condition Happy 0.2871287  
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Table 13: Variable Inflation Factor Table 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Major Art 1.66 0.603 
Major SMC 1.65 0.607 
Major Undeclared 1.44 0.694 
Condition Neutral 1.42 0.704 
Major Languages 1.41 0.707 
Condition Happy 1.35 0.739 
Trust Self Report 1.23 0.813 
Attachment to Bard 1.22 0.821 
Risk 1.09 0.916 
Empathy 1.07 0.934 
Mean VIF 1.35 
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Table 14: Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisenberg Test 
for Heteroskedasticity 
χ^2=0.34 
   P>χ^2=0.56       
 
 
 
 
 
   Table 15: White's Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Source χ^2 df P 
Heteroskedasticity 82.18 52 0.0048 
Skewness 24.09 10 0.0074 
Kurtosis 0.32 1 0.5716 
Total 106.59 63 0.0005 
χ^2=82.18 
   P>χ^2=0.05 
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Table 16: Comparison of Main Model With and Without Risk (Dependent Variable: 
Trust Behavior) 
  Risk No Risk 
Independent Variables β, SE β, SE 
Risk 0.626*** 
 
 
(0.184) 
 Empathy -0.379** -0.330* 
 
(0.187) (0.185) 
Attachment to Bard 0.594*** 0.588*** 
 
(0.208) (0.204) 
Trust Self-Report -0.075 -0.045 
 
(0.202) (0.196) 
Major Undeclared -0.115 0.243 
 
(0.648) (0.643) 
Major Art 0.090 0.103 
 
(0.485) (0.490) 
Major Languages 0.000 0.243 
 
(0.623) (0.618) 
Major SMC -0.254 -0.221 
 
(0.532) (0.528) 
Condition Neutral 1.070** 0.643 
 
(0.447) (0.428) 
Condition Happy 0.973** 0.667 
  (0.461) (0.448) 
  Observations = 101 Observations = 101 
 
χ^2  = 27.80 χ^2  = 15.70 
 
P > χ^2  = 0.002 P > χ^2  = 0.073 
 
Log likelihood = -209.44  Log likelihood = -215.50 
 Pseudo R^2 = 0.062 Pseudo R^2 = 0.035 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Comparison of Condition Dummies in Ordered Logit Model (Dependent 
Variable: Trust Behavior) 
  
Anger Reference 
Category 
Happy Reference 
Category 
Neutral Reference 
Category 
Independent 
Variables β, SE β, SE β, SE 
Risk 0.626*** 0.626*** 0.626*** 
 
(0.184) (0.184) (0.184) 
Empathy -0.379** -0.379** -0.379** 
 
(0.187) (0.187) (0.187) 
Attachment to 
Bard 0.594*** 0.594*** 0.594*** 
 
(0.208) (0.208) (0.208) 
Trust Self-Report -0.075 -0.075 -0.075 
 
(0.202) (0.202) (0.202) 
Major 
Undeclared -0.115 -0.115 -0.115 
 
(0.648) (0.648) (0.648) 
Major Art 0.090 0.090 0.090 
 
(0.485) (0.485) (0.485) 
Major Languages 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.623) (0.623) (0.623) 
Major SMC -0.254 -0.254 -0.254 
 
(0.532) (0.532) (0.532) 
Condition Neutral 1.070** 0.098 
 
 
(0.447) (0.476) 
 Condition Happy 0.973** 
 
-0.098 
 
(0.461) 
 
(0.476) 
Condition Anger 
 
-0.973** -1.070** 
  
 
(0.461) (0.447) 
Observations = 101 
χ^2  = 27.80 
P > χ^2  = 0.002 
Log likelihood = -209.448 
Pseudo R^2 = 0.062 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Scatter Plot Positive Affect by Condition 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Scatter Plot Negative Affect by Condition 
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Figure 3: Scatter Plot Susceptibility to Film Manipulation by Condition 
 
 
Figure 4: Scatter Plot for Trust Behavior by Risk 
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Figure 5: Scatter Plot of Empathy by Trust Behavior in the Anger Condition 
 
 
Figure 6: Scatter Plot of Attachment to Bard by Trust Behavior 
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Figure 7: Scatter Plot of Residuals by Fitted Values 
 
 
Figure 8: Histogram of Residuals 
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INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research study!  
 
Background. In the current study, we are interested in how visual stimuli influence 
performance on a motor task. 
 
What you will do in this study. You will watch a short film clip and then participate in a 
short writing exercise and survey.  This experiment will take approximately 5 minutes to 
complete. The experimenter will answer questions, although he or she may postpone 
some of them until the end of the session. 
 
Risks and Benefits. The film clip may include scenes that make you uncomfortable.  
These clips are taken from popular movies rated “R” or lower, so it is likely that these 
movie scenes are similar to those you see in your everyday life. 
 
Compensation. In exchange for participating in the experiment, you will receive a candy 
bar.  
 
Your rights as a participant. Your participation in this experiment is completely 
voluntary, and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time without penalty.  You 
will still receive payment for participating.  You may withdraw by informing the 
experimenter that you no longer wish to participate (no questions will be asked). 
 
The experimenter will tell you more about the study and our hypotheses at the end of the 
session. If you wish, you can send an email message to the principal investigator, Kristin 
Lane (lane@bard.edu) and we will send you a copy of any manuscripts based on the 
research (or summaries of our results). 
 
Confidentiality. Your answers and performance will remain confidential: your responses 
will be coded and only the primary researcher and Idan Elmelech, a student working with 
her, will be able to access a file that will match your name to your responses in this study. 
This file will be password-protected and securely stored. 
 
I have read the above form and certify that I am 18 years of age or older. I consent to 
participate in today's experiment. 
 
    ___________   _____________________________ 
            Date    Signature 
 
If you have questions about this study, please contact Kristin Lane, Department of 
Psychology, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504 or lane@bard.edu. If you 
have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Bard 
College Institutional Review Board: irb@bard.edu. 
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INFORMED CONSENT AGREEMENT 
 
In the current research study, we are interested in how people decide to invest 
monetary sums. 
 
Participant Role 
You will be asked to play a short game involving investment and money.  You 
will be playing this game over the computer against another anonymous 
participant.  This experiment will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
The experimenter will answer questions, although he or she may postpone some 
of them until the end of the session. 
 
Risks, Benefits, and Compensation 
Some participants may find that playing the game makes them anxious because 
they have to make decisions with real monetary payoffs. In exchange for 
participating in the experiment, your final monetary sum in the game will be 
translated into raffle tickets to win $200. 
 
Participant Rights 
I am aware that my participation in this experiment is completely voluntary. I 
understand the intent and purpose of this research. There will be no 
consequences of withdrawing from the study, and I will still get paid as 
indicated above. You may withdraw by informing the experimenter that you no 
longer wish to participate (no questions will be asked).  The experimenter will 
tell you more about the study and our hypotheses at the end of the session. If 
you wish, you can send an email message to the principal investigator, Idan 
Elmelech (ie446@bard.edu) and we will send you a copy of any manuscripts 
based on the research (or summaries of our results). 
 
Confidentiality 
Your answers and performance will remain confidential: your responses will be 
coded and only the primary researcher will be able to access a file that will 
match your name to your responses in this study. This file will be encrypted 
and securely stored. 
 
I have read the above form and certify that I am 18 years of age or older. I consent 
to participate in today's experiment. 
 
___________   _____________________________ 
   Date    Signature 
 
If you have questions about this study, please contact Idan Elmelech at 
ie446@bard.edu. The data collected from these experiments will go towards the 
completion of Idan Elmelech's senior project.  A copy of the project will be 
stored in the library.  If you have questions about your rights as a research 
participant, please contact the Bard College Institutional Review Board: 
irb@bard.edu. 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment! 	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Using	  your	  non-­‐dominant	  hand,	  please	  copy	  the	  following	  sentence.	  	  “The	  
woman	  went	  shopping.”	  	  _________________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  _________________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  _________________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  	  
This	  scale	  consists	  of	  a	  number	  of	  words	  that	  describe	  different	  feelings	  and	  
emotions.	  	  Please	  read	  each	  item	  and	  then	  mark	  the	  appropriate	  answer	  in	  the	  
space	  next	  to	  that	  word.	  	  Indicate	  to	  what	  extent	  you	  feel	  this	  way	  right	  now,	  
that	  is,	  at	  the	  present	  moment.	  	   	  	  	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Very	  slightly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  a	  little	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  moderately	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  quite	  a	  bit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  extremely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  or	  not	  at	  all	  	  Interested	  	  	  _________	  Distressed	  	  	  _________	  Excited	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Upset	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Strong	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Guilty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Scared	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Hostile	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Enthusiastic_________	  Proud	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Irritable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Alert	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Ashamed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Inspired	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Nervous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Determined	  	  _________	  Attentive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Jittery	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Active	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	  Afraid	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  _________	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Instructions 
 
In this experiment, you will play a game with another participant who 
will be responding to your decisions at a later date.  You have been 
matched with a single other participant.  You will not be told who the 
participant is either during or after the experiment and vice-versa.   
 
You will play the role of an investor and the other participant will play 
the role of an investment manager.  You will be given 10 points; these 
will be referred to as your endowment. At the end of the experiment 
each point will count as one raffle ticket towards the $200 lottery, so 
you want to end up with the greatest total number of points.  
  
The rules of the game are as follows:  
You can invest between 0 and 10 points of your endowment.  Every 
point you invest will be tripled (that is if you invest 5 points, this will 
yield 15 points) and sent to the other participant. He or she will then 
decide if, and what portion, of this new amount of points to give back 
to you and what portion to keep for themselves.  
 
The total points you will have at the end of this exchange will consist 
of whatever you decide to keep in addition to whatever the other 
participant returns to you. The other participant has been given their 
own 10-point endowment, is aware of all of the same rules, and the 
points that he or she has at the end of the game will go towards raffle 
tickets for a separate $200 raffle. 
 
 
Amount You Would like to invest:_________ 
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Survey 
How much do you agree with these statements? 
(1-Very Little/ 4-Somewhat/ 7-Strongly) 
 
1. I am a risk taker 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
2. I have spent time volunteering and will continue to do so 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
3. I generally trust people 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
4. I would hold the door open for someone even if it meant missing my train 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
5. I don’t usually help out other students 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
6. I don’t like to gamble 
    1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
7. It takes a long time for me to feel close to another person 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
8.  People consider me to be reckless 
                       1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
9. I always act with a high regard for the safety of my friends, my belongings, 
and myself 
                       1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
10. I feel that I fit in at Bard 
                         1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
11. I often feel that I am not able to depend on others 
                         1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
12. I fit in more at my high school than I do at Bard 
                         1        2        3        4        5        6        7         
 
13. I usually make conservative or safe decisions 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
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14. The average Bard student has a lot of the same worldviews as I do  
                        1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
15. I feel that people betray me a lot  
                         1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
16. I empathize very strongly with characters in TV shows and films 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
17.  The average Bard student is trustworthy 
                        1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
18. I feel that some people don't deserve help or kindness 
                         1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
19.  When watching a movie with friends I’m usually the least emotional person 
in the group 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
20. I have found a group of close friends at Bard  
                         1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
21. I usually cry when I watch sad movies 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
22.  I do not usually react emotionally to hardships experienced by others 
   1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 
 
Please Answer the following questions to the best of your ability.  
1) What is your age? 
 
2) What is your gender? 
 
3) What year in college are you? 
 
4) What is your major? 
 
5) What do you think the Research Hypotheses of these experiments are? 
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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6) Do you think there is a connection between the two experiments you just 
participated in? If so, what do you think that connection is? 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 7)	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  informing	  you	  if	  you	  win	  the	  lottery	  we	  ask	  that	  you	  print	  your	  email	  address	  here.	  
______________________________________________________________________________	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Survey	  Coding	  1) Risk	  Preference	  (lower	  score=	  less	  risk	  taking	  tendencies)	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   1,	  -­‐6,	  8,	  -­‐9,	  -­‐13	  2) Empathy	  (lower	  score=	  less	  empathy)	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2,	  4,	  16,	  -­‐18,	  -­‐22	  3) Attachment	  to	  Bard	  Community	  (lower	  score=	  less	  attachment)	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐5,	  10,	  -­‐12,	  14,	  20	  4) Trust	  (lower	  score=	  less	  trust)	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  3,	  -­‐7,	  -­‐11,	  -­‐15,	  17	  5) Susceptibility	  to	  film	  manipulation	  (lower	  score=	  less	  susceptible)***	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  16,	  -­‐19,	  21	  	  ***	  This	  measure	  ranges	  between	  3	  and	  21	  instead	  of	  5	  and	  35.	  	  It	  is	  not	  included	  in	  the	  main	  multiple	  regression	  and	  is	  only	  used	  as	  a	  manipulation	  check.	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Debriefing	  Form	  	  Thank	  you	  for	  completing	  the	  study!	  	  	   We	  are	  interested	  in	  how	  emotions	  influence	  trust	  decisions.	  	  The	  two	  studies	  you	  participated	  in	  were	  actually	  part	  of	  a	  single	  larger	  study.	  	  We	  felt	  it	  necessary	  to	  tell	  you	  that	  there	  were	  two	  separate	  studies	  in	  this	  task	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  participants	  from	  guessing	  the	  true	  research	  hypothesis.	  	  	  	  	  	   The	  first	  task	  primed	  emotions.	  	  Studies	  have	  shown	  that	  people	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  trusting	  when	  they	  experience	  positive	  emotions	  and	  less	  trusting	  when	  they	  experience	  negative	  emotions.	  	  The	  second	  task	  was	  a	  commonly	  used	  task	  in	  behavioral	  game	  theory.	  	  The	  decisions	  you	  made	  in	  this	  task	  were	  designed	  to	  gauge	  how	  trusting	  you	  were	  in	  decisions	  involving	  money.	  	  Normally,	  people	  in	  western	  societies	  tend	  to	  exhibit	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  trust	  towards	  anonymous	  others	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  game.	  	  We	  hypothesized	  that	  people	  with	  positive	  emotions	  such	  as	  happiness	  would	  be	  more	  trusting	  than	  people	  with	  negative	  emotions	  such	  as	  anger.	  	  Thus,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  study	  induced	  a	  certain	  emotion,	  and	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  study	  measured	  trust	  levels.	  	  	   This	  experiment	  has	  implications	  for	  how	  emotions	  that	  are	  unrelated	  to	  a	  decision	  influence	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  	  The	  points	  you	  accrued	  in	  the	  trust	  game	  (experiment	  2)	  will	  be	  entered	  into	  a	  raffle	  for	  a	  prize	  of	  $200,	  you	  will	  be	  notified	  by	  email	  if	  you	  won	  this	  prize.	  	  	  	  	   If	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  learning	  more	  about	  the	  study,	  or	  the	  results,	  or	  if	  you	  have	  questions	  about	  the	  lottery	  winnings,	  please	  contact	  Idan	  Elmelech	  at	  ie446@bard.edu	  or	  Kristin	  Lane	  at	  lane@bard.edu.	  	   Thank	  you	  again	  for	  participating	  in	  our	  experiments! 
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Recruiter	  Script	  
Hi,	  we	  are	  running	  a	  series	  of	  two	  psychology	  experiments	  today	  in	  the	  
president’s	  room.	  	  The	  payoffs	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  experiments	  are	  a	  candy	  bar	  and	  
raffle	  tickets	  to	  a	  $200	  lottery.	  	  If	  you	  are	  interested	  in	  participating	  please	  let	  me	  
know.	   	  
Experimenter	  Script	  	   Hi,	  are	  you	  here	  for	  the	  psychology	  experiments?	  
	   Welcome.	  Please	  have	  a	  seat	  at	  one	  of	  the	  computers.	  	  Today	  we	  are	  running	  a	  
series	  of	  two	  experiments,	  the	  first	  is	  for	  Professor	  Kristin	  Lane’s	  social	  psych	  lab	  and	  
the	  second	  is	  for	  my	  senior	  project.	  	  The	  payoff	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  first	  experiment	  
is	  a	  candy	  bar	  and	  for	  the	  second	  is	  a	  entrance	  to	  a	  lottery	  for	  $200.	  	  Here	  is	  the	  
consent	  form	  for	  the	  first	  experiment.	  Are	  you	  all	  over	  18?	  	  	  
If	  no:	  	  
I’m	  sorry	  but	  you	  can’t	  participate	  in	  the	  experiment,	  we	  are	  only	  allowed	  to	  run	  
participants	  that	  are	  18	  years	  or	  older.	  Please	  feel	  free	  to	  take	  a	  candy	  bar	  and	  thanks	  
for	  coming	  in.	  	  
If	  yes:	  	  
This	  consent	  form	  says	  that	  you	  have	  the	  right	  to	  leave	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  course	  
of	  the	  experiment.	  All	  of	  your	  responses	  in	  this	  experiment	  will	  be	  completely	  
confidential,	  any	  identifying	  information	  will	  be	  securely	  stored	  in	  the	  social	  psych	  lab	  
and	  only	  Kristin	  Lane	  and	  I	  will	  have	  access	  to	  it.	  	  If	  you	  do	  choose	  to	  leave	  before	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  experiment	  you	  can	  still	  take	  your	  candy	  bar.	  	  
Once	  participants	  have	  all	  completed	  the	  consent	  forms:	  
I	  can	  take	  those	  if	  you’re	  done.	  Thank	  you.	  	  Whenever	  you’re	  ready	  you	  can	  feel	  free	  to	  
put	  on	  the	  headphones	  and	  press	  play.	  	  
Once	  participants	  have	  finished	  watching	  the	  film	  clips	  the	  experimenter	  will	  
hand	  them	  the	  motor	  coordination	  task	  and	  PANAS:	  
This	  next	  section	  contains	  a	  motor	  task	  and	  short	  survey;	  please	  complete	  it	  to	  the	  best	  
of	  your	  ability.	  	  	  
Once	  participants	  have	  completed	  the	  motor	  task	  and	  PANAS,	  experimenter	  
collects	  these	  sheets	  and	  hands	  out	  second	  consent	  form:	  
So	  that’s	  it	  for	  the	  first	  experiment.	  	  Here	  are	  the	  consent	  forms	  for	  the	  second	  
experiment.	  	  Once	  again,	  you	  have	  the	  right	  to	  leave	  at	  any	  time	  during	  the	  course	  of	  
the	  experiment.	  If	  you	  choose	  to	  leave	  during	  the	  experiment	  you	  will	  still	  be	  entered	  
into	  the	  lottery.	  	  All	  of	  your	  responses	  in	  this	  experiment	  will	  be	  completely	  
confidential,	  any	  identifying	  information	  will	  be	  securely	  stored	  in	  the	  social	  psych	  lab	  
and	  only	  my	  advisers,	  Kristin	  Lane	  and	  Ani	  Mitra,	  and	  I	  will	  have	  access	  to	  it.	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Once	  participants	  have	  signed	  second	  consent	  form,	  experimenter	  collects	  
consent	  form	  and	  hands	  out	  trust	  game	  instructions,	  which	  are	  stapled	  to	  final	  
survey:	  
Thank	  you.	  Here	  are	  the	  instructions	  for	  the	  experiment,	  they	  are	  attached	  to	  another	  
short	  survey	  that	  we	  would	  like	  you	  to	  fill	  out	  once	  you	  have	  finished	  the	  experiment.	  	  
We	  ask	  that	  you	  fully	  complete	  the	  first	  page	  before	  moving	  on	  to	  the	  survey.	  Let	  me	  
know	  if	  you	  have	  any	  questions.	  	  	  
Once	  participants	  finish	  trust	  game	  and	  survey:	  	  
If	  not	  all	  the	  participants	  have	  finished	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  experimenter	  
collects	  trust	  game	  instruction	  and	  survey	  sheets	  from	  any	  participants	  that	  
have	  finished	  early	  and	  says:	  
Thanks	  for	  your	  participation.	  	  We	  have	  a	  short	  debriefing	  for	  you	  guys	  so	  we	  ask	  that	  
you	  stay	  a	  little	  longer	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  participants	  finish.	  If	  you’re	  in	  a	  rush,	  we	  
have	  a	  written	  debriefing,	  which	  you	  can	  also	  take.	  	  	  
Once	  all	  participants	  are	  finished:	  
Thank	  you	  for	  completing	  our	  experiments.	  	  How	  did	  you	  guys	  like	  them?	  	  	  
	  
Were	  all	  the	  instructions	  and	  questions	  pretty	  clear?	  
	  
I’d	  like	  to	  tell	  you	  a	  little	  bit	  more	  about	  what	  we	  are	  up	  to.	  	  What	  we	  were	  actually	  
looking	  at	  was	  how	  emotions	  influence	  trust	  decisions.	  	  Although	  we	  told	  you	  that	  you	  
were	  taking	  part	  in	  two	  separate	  studies,	  two	  tasks	  were	  actually	  separate	  parts	  of	  the	  
same	  experiment.	  	  So	  the	  first	  ‘experiment’	  you	  guys	  participated	  in	  was	  supposed	  to	  
induce	  a	  certain	  emotion	  by	  showing	  you	  a	  video.	  	  You	  either	  saw	  a	  video	  that	  was	  
intended	  to	  make	  people	  feel	  happy	  or	  angry,	  or	  a	  neutral	  third	  video.	  	  The	  second	  
‘experiment’	  was	  designed	  to	  measure	  trust	  through	  the	  game	  you	  played	  with	  the	  
points	  for	  the	  lottery.	  	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  whether	  the	  video	  you	  watched	  influenced	  
how	  much	  money	  you	  were	  willing	  to	  give	  to	  the	  investor.	  	  Does	  that	  all	  make	  sense?	  
	  
Another	  important	  point	  is	  that	  there	  is	  not	  actually	  another	  group	  of	  participants	  
responding	  to	  your	  actions	  in	  the	  second	  experiment.	  	  Instead,	  your	  entry	  in	  the	  lottery	  
will	  be	  based	  on	  an	  algorithm	  we	  have	  that	  is	  a	  function	  of	  how	  much	  to	  give	  back	  to	  
you	  based	  on	  how	  many	  points	  you	  chose	  to	  invest	  and	  how	  much	  you	  kept.	  	  Now	  that	  
everyone	  is	  aware	  of	  all	  of	  this,	  would	  it	  still	  be	  okay	  to	  use	  your	  responses	  in	  our	  data	  
analysis?	  
	  
Excellent,	  thank	  you.	  	  We	  have	  written	  debriefing	  forms	  that	  restate	  what	  I	  just	  told	  
you	  about	  the	  experiment,	  you’re	  welcome	  to	  take	  one	  if	  you’d	  like.	  Feel	  free	  to	  take	  a	  
candy	  bar	  and	  we’ll	  notify	  you	  by	  email	  if	  you	  won	  the	  lottery.	  	  Thanks	  again	  for	  your	  
participation.	  
	  
	  
	  
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 116	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  
INCIDENTAL EMOTIONS AND TRUST DECISIONS 117	  
IRB	  Application	  
Section	  1	  
Name	  (Last,	  First):	   Elmelech,	  Idan	  
 
Email:    ie446@bard.edu 	  
Phone	  Number:	  8457500170	  	  
Program:	  Psychology/Economics	  	  
Status:	  Undergrad	  	  
Name	  of	  your	  adviser	  or	  faculty	  sponsor:	  Kristin	  Lane,	  Aniruddha	  Mitra	  	  
Your	  adviser's	  or	  faculty	  sponsor's	  email	  address:	  lane@bard.edu	  amitra@bard.edu	  	  
Today’s	  date:	  October,30,	  2013	  	  
Section	  2	  
	  
I	  have	  read	  the	  IRB’s	  Categories	  of	  Review,	  and	  my	  proposal	  qualifies	  for	  a:	  
¨ Expedited	  Review	  	  
Do	  you	  have	  external	  funding	  for	  this	  research?	  
¨ No	  	  
If	  so,	  state	  name	  of	  granting	  institution	  and	  the	  title	  of	  the	  project	  as	  it	  was	  submitted	  
to	  that	  institution.	  	  	  
When	  do	  you	  plan	  to	  begin	  collecting	  data	  for	  this	  project?	  (begin	  date):	  November	  18,	  2013	  	  	  
When	  do	  plan	  to	  end	  your	  data	  collection	  for	  this	  project?	  (end	  date)	  November	  18,	  2014	  	  
What	  is	  the	  title	  of	  your	  project?	  	  Incidental	  Emotions	  and	  Trust	  Decisions	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Describe	  your	  research	  question	  briefly	  (approximately	  250	  words	  or	  less):	  	  The	  research	  question	  of	  this	  project	  relates	  to	  how	  emotions	  impact	  economic	  behavior,	  specifically	  decisions	  involving	  trust.	  	  Research	  in	  both	  micro	  and	  macro	  economics	  has	  indicated	  that	  trust	  is	  an	  essential	  facilitator	  of	  economic	  activity	  (Knack	  and	  Keefer,	  1997;	  Snagnier,	  2013;	  Beugelsdijk,	  Groot	  &	  Van	  	  Schaik,	  2002;	  Nichols,	  Danford	  &	  Tasiran,	  2009).	  	  In	  addition,	  research	  in	  both	  behavioral	  economics	  and	  social	  psychology	  has	  indicated	  that	  emotional	  influences	  significantly	  impact	  trust	  behaviors	  exhibited	  by	  individuals	  (Camerer,	  2004;	  Elster,	  1998;	  Lowenstein,	  2000;	  Dunn	  and	  Schweitzer,	  2005).	  	  Combining	  these	  findings,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  investigate	  whether,	  and	  how,	  incidental	  emotions	  (emotions	  that	  are	  unrelated	  to	  a	  decision)	  would	  impact	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  and	  outcomes	  of	  a	  trust	  decision.	  	  
 
Will	  your	  participants	  include	  individuals	  from	  specific	  populations	  (e.g.,	  children,	  
pregnant	  women,	  prisoners,	  or	  the	  cognitively	  impaired)?	  	  
¨ No	  	  
If	  your	  participants	  will	  include	  individuals	  from	  specific	  populations,	  please	  specify	  
the	  population(s)	  and	  briefly	  describe	  any	  special	  precautions	  you	  will	  use.	  	  N/A	  	  
Briefly	  describe	  how	  you	  will	  recruit	  participants.	  (e.g.,	  Who	  will	  approach	  
participants?	  What	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  participants?)	  	  	   1. Campus	  center:	  We	  will	  set	  up	  tables	  at	  the	  campus	  center	  to	  recruit	  and	  run	  participants.	  Participants	  will	  be	  approached	  as	  they	  walk	  through	  the	  campus	  center.	  	  If	  they	  wish	  to	  participate,	  they	  will	  be	  escorted	  to	  a	  private	  room	  to	  complete	  the	  experiment.	  2. Kline	  commons:	  We	  will	  reserve	  a	  room	  at	  Kline	  to	  recruit	  and	  run	  participants.	  	  Participants	  will	  be	  approached	  as	  they	  are	  leaving	  or	  entering	  the	  meal	  area.	  	  If	  they	  wish	  to	  participate,	  they	  will	  be	  escorted	  to	  a	  private	  room	  to	  complete	  the	  experiment.	  3. Classrooms:	  In	  consultation	  with	  professors,	  we	  will	  make	  announcements	  at	  the	  end	  of	  classes	  and	  offer	  compensation	  to	  any	  student	  who	  wishes	  to	  stay	  and	  complete	  the	  study.	  These	  data	  collection	  sessions	  will	  not	  take	  any	  class	  time.	  4. We	  will	  post	  flyers	  in	  the	  campus	  center,	  at	  Kline,	  at	  the	  shuttle	  stops,	  in	  the	  computer	  labs,	  and	  in	  freshman	  dorms	  on	  campus.	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Briefly describe the procedures you will be using to conduct your research.  Include 
descriptions of what tasks your participants will be asked to do, and about how much 
time will be expected of each individual.    
NOTE:  If you have supporting materials (recruitment posters, printed surveys, etc.) 
please email these documents separately as attachments to IRB@bardresearch.com. 
Name your attachments with your last name and a brief description (e.g., 
"WatsonConsentForm.doc"). 
PROCEDURE	  
	  	   Deception	  will	  be	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  experiment	  and	  reduce	  demand	  characteristics.	  	  Therefore	  I	  would	  like	  to	  present	  the	  experiment	  to	  participants	  as	  two	  separate,	  unrelated,	  experiments.	  	  The	  experimental	  manipulation	  will	  be	  the	  first	  'experiment'	  presented	  to	  the	  participants.	  	  Based	  on	  studies	  by	  Dunn	  and	  Schweitzer	  (2005)	  and	  Harle	  and	  Sanfey	  (2007),	  I	  would	  like	  to	  employ	  film	  clips	  and	  a	  short	  writing	  exercise	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  emotion.	  	  	  	   The	  film	  clips	  will	  be	  fairly	  short	  (approximately	  5	  minutes)	  and	  the	  writing	  exercise	  will	  ask	  participants	  to	  reflect	  and	  write	  about	  a	  time	  when	  they	  felt	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  main	  character	  or	  characters	  in	  the	  film.	  	  This	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  effectively	  induce	  low	  to	  moderate	  levels	  of	  emotion	  (Hewig,	  Hagemann,	  Seifert,	  Gollwitzer,	  Naumann	  &	  Bartussek.	  2005).	  	   Three	  different	  film	  clips	  will	  be	  employed	  for	  the	  two	  experimental	  groups	  and	  single	  control	  group.	  	  The	  emotional	  manipulations	  for	  the	  two	  experimental	  groups	  are	  anger	  and	  happiness.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  film	  clip	  that	  has	  previously	  been	  used	  to	  manipulate	  anger	  is	  a	  128	  second	  clip	  from	  the	  1982	  film	  Ghandi,	  in	  which	  a	  policeman	  beats	  a	  man	  for	  illegally	  burning	  apartheid	  passes	  (Hewig,	  Hagemann,	  Seifert,	  Gollwitzer,	  Naumann	  &	  Bartussek.	  2005).	  	  These	  manipulations	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  induce	  low	  to	  moderate	  levels	  of	  these	  emotions.	  	  The	  control	  group	  will	  be	  given	  an	  emotionally	  neutral	  film	  clip	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  experimental	  validity	  and	  establish	  a	  baseline.	  	  	  	   The	  second	  'experiment'	  will	  consist	  of	  a	  simple	  game	  with	  small	  monetary	  payoffs	  as	  performance	  incentives.	  	  This	  game	  was	  proposed	  by	  Berg,	  Dickhaut	  and	  McCabe	  (1995)	  and	  has	  been	  replicated	  multiple	  times.	  	  In	  this	  game,	  the	  participant	  is	  given	  a	  certain	  'endowment'	  (these	  will	  be	  a	  representation	  of	  money	  such	  as	  poker	  chips	  that	  will	  go	  towards	  a	  lottery	  prize	  of	  $200	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment–	  the	  number	  of	  chips	  they	  have	  at	  the	  end	  will	  be	  their	  number	  of	  entries	  into	  the	  raffle).	  	  The	  participant	  is	  told	  that	  they	  are	  an	  Investor	  and	  that	  they	  can	  choose	  to	  keep	  or	  invest	  this	  endowment.	  	  If	  the	  participant	  chooses	  to	  invest,	  they	  give	  a	  portion	  (or	  all)	  of	  their	  endowment	  to	  an	  anonymous	  'Trustee'.	  	  The	  Trustee	  then	  'invests'	  and	  earns	  a	  certain	  return	  on	  the	  investment.	  	  The	  Trustee	  must	  then	  decide	  what	  portion,	  if	  any,	  of	  the	  investment	  to	  return	  to	  the	  Investor.	  	  In	  my	  experiment,	  the	  game	  would	  be	  played	  over	  the	  computer	  on	  a	  chat	  program.	  	  The	  participants	  would	  all	  be	  Investors	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Trustee	  would	  be	  played	  by	  a	  confederate	  who	  would	  be	  instructed	  to	  give	  predetermined	  responses	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  return.	  	  This	  game	  would	  be	  played	  for	  up	  to	  3	  rounds.	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   Following	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  experiment,	  participants	  will	  be	  given	  a	  post-­‐experiment	  questionnaire	  to	  collect	  demographic	  information	  and	  check	  that	  the	  manipulation	  was	  effective.	  	  The	  questionnaire	  will	  also	  investigate	  whether	  the	  deception	  was	  effective.	  	  Participants	  will	  then	  be	  debriefed	  by	  the	  experimenter	  and	  rewarded	  for	  their	  participation	  with	  a	  candy	  bar	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  winning	  the	  $200	  lottery	  using	  the	  points	  (poker	  chips)	  they	  accumulated	  in	  the	  trust	  game	  as	  raffle	  tickets.	  	  	  	  
Approximately how many individuals do you expect to participate in your study? 120	  	  
Please	  describe	  any	  risks	  and	  benefits	  your	  research	  may	  have	  for	  your	  participants.	  
(For	  example,	  one	  study's	  risks	  might	  include	  minor	  emotional	  discomfort	  and	  eye	  
strain.	  The	  same	  study's	  benefits	  might	  include	  satisfaction	  from	  contributing	  to	  
scientific	  knowledge	  and	  greater	  self-­‐awareness.)	  	  	  	  Risks:	  Participants	  in	  the	  experimental	  group	  for	  'anger'	  may	  feel	  angry	  after	  watching	  the	  film	  clip	  and	  writing	  about	  it.	  If	  they	  strongly	  identify	  with	  the	  main	  character	  they	  might	  experience	  moderate	  anger	  levels.	  	  However,	  because	  these	  manipulations	  for	  anger	  have	  been	  used	  before	  and	  will	  be	  taken	  from	  feature	  films,	  the	  risks	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  minimal	  (Hewig,	  Hagemann,	  Seifert,	  Gollwitzer,	  Naumann,	  Bartussek,	  2005).	  	  Also,	  because	  these	  are	  popular	  movies,	  this	  risk	  is	  no	  different	  than	  that	  assumed	  in	  going	  to	  a	  movie	  in	  everyday	  life.	  	   	   	   	  Benefits:	  Participants	  will	  earn	  a	  candy	  bar	  and	  a	  chance	  of	  winning	  $200	  in	  a	  raffle.	  They	  can	  also	  learn	  more	  about	  psychology	  research	  and	  become	  more	  self	  aware	  in	  learning	  about	  how	  trusting	  they	  are	  in	  decisions	  involving	  money.	  	  	  	  
Have you prepared a consent form and emailed it as an attachment to 
IRB@bardresearch.com? 
 
[See attached at the end of this document.] 
Please include here the verbal description of the consent process (how you will explain 
the consent form and the consent process to your participants): 
For "public locations”: Participants will be recruited as they walk by and asked if they’d 
like to receive candy and the possibility of winning $200 in exchange for completing two 
short studies.  After confirming that they are at least 18 years of age, they will read over 
the consent form. 
For class recruitment: Researchers will make the following announcement: My name is 
[name] and I am a student working with Professor Kristin Lane in Bard College’s Social 
Psychology lab. We’re collecting data for two short studies today and we are seeking 
volunteers. The total time to complete the two studies is approximately 20 minutes; if you 
stay and participate we can offer you a candy bar as well as a chance to win $200. All 
participants will then receive a copy of the written consent form. 
If your project will require that you use only a verbal consent process (no written consent 
forms), please describe why this process is necessary, how verbal consent will be 
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obtained, and any additional precautions you will take to ensure the confidentiality of 
your participants. 
 
What procedures will you use to ensure that the information your participants provide 
will remain confidential? 
Due to the fact that the number of chances in the lottery depends on participants’ 
performance in the study, we will need to match participants’ names to their data.  
Participants’ responses will be kept in a password-protected document. Only Kristin 
Lane, Ani Mitra, and I will have the password to this document.  Once the lottery 
payment is made, participants’ names will be deleted from the computer file, thus 
anonymyzing the data.  
 
Will it be necessary to use deception with your participants at any time during this 
research?   Please note: withholding details about the specifics of one's hypothesis does 
not constitute deception.  However, misleading participants about the nature of the 
research question or about the nature of the task they will be completing does constitute 
deception. 
¨ Yes	  	  
If	  your	  project	  study	  includes	  deception,	  please	  describe	  here	  the	  process	  you	  will	  use,	  
why	  the	  deception	  is	  necessary,	  and	  a	  full	  description	  of	  your	  debriefing	  
procedures.	  	  Deception	  will	  be	  necessary	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  internal	  validity.	  	  If	  the	  participants	  were	  to	  know	  the	  hypothesis	  (the	  emotions	  are	  expected	  to	  influence	  decision	  making	  in	  the	  trust	  game)	  this	  would	  introduce	  task	  demands	  and	  skew	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study.	  The	  deception	  used	  will	  involve	  presenting	  the	  study	  as	  two	  separate	  experiments.	  	  There	  will	  be	  a	  separate	  consent	  form	  for	  each	  experiment	  that	  will	  fit	  into	  the	  deception.	  	  Participants	  will	  be	  told	  that	  the	  first	  experiment	  is	  being	  conducted	  for	  Kristin	  Lane's	  social	  psychology	  lab	  in	  order	  to	  see	  how	  visual	  stimuli	  influence	  performance	  on	  a	  motor	  task	  (ie.,	  handwriting).	  The	  second	  experiment	  will	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  short	  study	  involving	  economic	  decision-­‐making	  that	  is	  being	  conducted	  for	  a	  senior	  project	  in	  economics.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  study,	  participants	  will	  be	  given	  a	  debriefing	  sheet	  (included	  in	  the	  appendix)	  that	  informs	  them	  of	  the	  actual	  research	  hypothesis	  and	  why	  the	  deception	  was	  necessary.	  	  They	  will	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  study	  and	  asked	  to	  keep	  the	  research	  hypothesis	  to	  themselves	  so	  that	  the	  participant	  pool	  will	  not	  be	  contaminated.	  	  The	  use	  of	  deception	  here	  will	  be	  solely	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  research	  hypothesis,	  not	  the	  content	  or	  tasks	  involved	  in	  the	  study.	  	  Participants	  will	  be	  fully	  and	  accurately	  informed	  of	  the	  tasks	  we	  wish	  them	  to	  complete	  prior	  to	  the	  start	  of	  each	  part	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  The	  deception	  will	  simply	  serve	  to	  hide	  the	  true	  research	  hypothesis	  from	  participants	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  task	  demands	  that	  would	  skew	  results.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment,	  after	  the	  participant	  reads	  the	  debriefing	  form,	  the	  experimenter	  will	  ask	  them	  if	  they	  have	  any	  questions	  or	  comments	  regarding	  the	  experiment.	  	  This	  will	  give	  participants	  the	  opportunity	  to	  voice	  any	  questions	  or	  concerns	  regarding	  the	  use	  of	  deception.	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For	  projects	  not	  using	  deception,	  please	  include	  your	  debriefing	  statement.	  (This	  is	  
information	  you	  provide	  to	  the	  participant	  at	  the	  end	  of	  your	  study	  to	  explain	  your	  
research	  question	  more	  fully	  than	  you	  may	  have	  been	  able	  to	  do	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
study.)	  	  All	  studies	  must	  include	  a	  debriefing	  statement.	  	  Be	  sure	  to	  give	  
participants	  the	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  any	  additional	  questions	  they	  may	  have	  about	  the	  
study.	  	  	  See	  emailed	  attachments.	  	  
Section	  3.	  	  	  N/A	  
	  
Section	  4.	  	  To	  finalize	  and	  submit	  your	  application.	  	  Please	  verify	  that	  you	  have	  completed	  this	  form	  fully	  and	  accurately.	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IRB	  Approval	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